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BRINGING COHERENCE TO DEFAMATION LAW
THROUGH UNIFORM LEGISLATION: THE
SEARCH FOR AN ELEGANT SOLUTION
ROBERT M. AcERmAN*
One of the most uncertain areas of modern American juris-
prudence, the law of defamation remains largely a mystery to
commentators and practitioners alike. In response to this confu-
sion, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
recently convened a committee to draft a Uniform Defamation
Act. Although the committee withdrew this Act from considera-
tion, the Commissioners passed in its place the Uniform Correc-
tion or Clarification of Defamation Act, a document drawn
largely from one article of its predecessor. The Correction Act
seeks to alter the shape of defamation litigation without substan-
tially modifying the underlying law. More specifically, it encour-
ages early settlement of disputes by providing for the elimination
of general and punitive damages in situations when a publisher
timely and sufficiently corrects or clarifies the disputedly defama-
tory statement.
In this Article, Professor Ackerman examines both the pro-
posed Defamation Act and the Correction Act in detail, discuss-
ing, in particular, implementation of the Correction Act and its
likely impact in states choosing to adopt the new law. In addi-
tion, Professor Ackerman offers a new proposal to better stream-
line defamation law in fulfillment of three primary goals:
protection of speech; protection of reputation; and efficiency in
implementation. Professor Ackerman suggests that the most ef-
fective means of achieving a more coherent body of defamation
law loyal to these goals would employ a tripartite verdict proce-
dure providing for explicit jury findings as to defamation, falsity,
and fault, and would limit damages to objectively ascertainable
amounts. This procedure, Professor Ackerman believes, would
provide the most appropriate balance between plaintiffs' interests
in clearing their names and defendants' federal constitutional
concerns.
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1973, Colgate University; J.D.
1976, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Dean Randall P. Bezanson of Wash-
ington and Lee University and Professors Stephanie T. Farrior and Michael A. Mogill of the
Dickinson School of Law for their valuable comments, criticism and support. The author would
also like to thank my research assistants, Michelle Frantz, Kristin Hyland, Jim Townsend and
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of defamation is in disarray. It is confusing. It is unclear.
Most critically, it fails to serve its most important objectives: providing an
adequate remedy for reputational harm while allowing sufficient protection
for speech. The chaotic nature of defamation law is primarily due to the
fact that, at present, defamation involves a juxtaposition of two bodies of
law: (1) the archaic state common law of libel and slander, a system arising
from medieval roots, and (2) First Amendment jurisprudence, as developed
by the courts following the United States Supreme Court's landmark New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan' decision in 1964. The latter body of law, of
necessity, imposes only federal constitutional limitations on what remains
essentially a state cause of action. As a result, the law of defamation resem-
bles a creature fashioned by committee, or worse yet, one fashioned by
several independent committees working in separate rooms in different eras
with different blueprints-some building up and others chiseling down.2
Because of the confusion and frustration that attends the law of defa-
mation, several individuals and groups have suggested various reform
measures.' Significant among these was a proposed Uniform Defamation
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court held that the Constitution "prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Iad at 279-80.
2. Robert Sack has likened the few successful plaintiffs in the law of defamation to "the
remnants of an army platoon caught in an enemy crossfire. Their awards stand witness to their
good luck, not to their virtue, their skill, or the justice of their cause." ROBERT SACK, LmEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS xxvi (1980).
3. One early example is Professor Robert A. Leflar's suggestion of a retraction or right of
reply remedy patterned after Arkansas's old "lie bill." Robert A. Leflar, Legal Remedies for
Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423, 423-26 (1952). For more recent examples, see H.R. 2846, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introducing a bill by Representative Charles Schumer that would have
established a new cause of action for libel with a declaratory judgment remedy); Marc A. Frank-
lin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REv. 809, 812-13
(1986) (advocating a declaratory judgment proposal); Annenberg Washington Program, Proposal
for the Reform of Libel Law (1988) (proposing a comprehensive model Libel Reform Act with
emphasis on nonmonetary damage remedies). See generally Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J.
Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 25 (1989) (discussing the proposal).
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Act ("proposed Act"), drafted under the auspices of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("the Commissioners"). 4
The proposed Act was the product of several years' work by the Drafting
Committee. The Committee concluded not only that "the state of the law is
in chaos," but that "some issues may not be fit for judicial resolution." S
The proposed Act attempted to address these problems primarily by provid-
ing yet another judicial remedy-in this case a "vindication remedy"-to
supplement the traditional damages remedy for defamation.
Unfortunately, instead of simplifying matters, the inclusion of the vin-
dication remedy added another layer of complexity and controversy to an
already confusing area of law without guaranteeing redress of the current
system's major flaws. Indeed, the vindication remedy drew so much criti-
cism that the Drafting Committee ultimately withdrew the proposed Act
from consideration.6 In its place, the Commissioners adopted the Uniform
Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act ("Correction Act"), a series
of provisions extracted from the final committee draft of the proposed Act.'
The Correction Act provides incentives for the early resolution of litigation
on terms acceptable to both plaintiffs and defendants. While it fails to ad-
dress certain deficiencies of defamation law, the Correction Act, if widely
enacted, could dramatically alter the manner in which defamation cases are
litigated.
This Article will briefly review the infirmities that plague contempo-
rary defamation law in the United States. It will examine the reforms in-
cluded in the proposed Act and consider whether any of the provisions that
were not included in the Correction Act are nevertheless worth salvaging.
It will then examine the Correction Act, which the Commissioners ulti-
mately adopted. Next, the Article will offer criteria for reforming the law
of defamation and consider the extent to which the Correction Act ad-
dresses these criteria. It will also suggest an alternative reform proposal
tailored to meet these criteria. Lastly, the Article will consider the appro-
priate vehicles for these and other reform proposals, examining whether
4. The Drafting Committee, chaired by Dean Harvey S. Perlman of the University of Ne-
braska College of Law, was appointed in 1989. That committee produced at least six discussion
drafts of a Uniform Defamation Act. Unless otherwise indicated, comments herein are based on
the March 23, 1993 Discussion Draft, which was the final version of the proposed Act before it
was withdrawn in June of 1993. It will hereinafter be referred to in citations as "PROPOSED UNIn.
DEFAMATION AcT."
5. PROPOSED UNiF. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, Prefatory Note.
6. See News Notes, 21 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA), June 8, 1993.
7. The Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act is substantially identical to
Article IV (§§ 4-101 through 4-106) of the March 23, 1993 Committee Draft of the proposed Act.
Comments and quotations herein are based on the October 13, 1993 Unofficial Final Draft of the
Correction Act. Hereinafter, it will be referred to in citations as the "UNiF. CORR. OR CLARu'.
Acr."
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they are best advanced by the courts or the legislatures, whether at the state
or national level, and whether on a uniform or state-by-state basis.
This Article posits that the law of defamation suffers from the same
ailments that plague tort law generally, albeit in exaggerated form. For ex-
ample, in personal injury cases, plaintiffs often are thwarted by limitations
on liability that preclude jury access.' Those plaintiffs who prevail, how-
ever, frequently enjoy grossly inflated damage awards.9 This pattern ap-
pears to be repeated, in exaggerated form, in defamation cases. Due largely
to First Amendment constraints, many plaintiffs are denied access to any
remedy for defamation; for the fortunate few who reach the jury, however,
judgments have attained epic proportions. 10 Although defamation cases ex-
emplify the most pronounced problems of the tort system, they also offer
the greatest opportunity for meaningful reform, as defamation claims offer
the possibility of win/win solutions in which the plaintiff can be made
whole, or at least nearly whole, at relatively little cost to the defendant.
8. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-47-128.5 (1991) (severely limiting actions against vendors
of alcohol); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (1982) (limiting actions that can be brought against
government entities; similar to tort claims acts of several jurisdictions); Wis. STAT. § 125.035
(codifying the rule in Olsen v. Copeland, 280 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Wis. 1979), that extended limited
immunity.to persons who negligently furnish liquor to another; the statute effectively overruled
Sorensen v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984), which itself had overruled Olsen); see also Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (denying claim by member of armed forces for injuries
incurred while on duty); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. 1969) (denying claim
for wrongful death on behalf of children killed in utero); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197
N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (denying claim for emotional distress suffered by mother upon
seeing newborn daughter dropped on tile floor of hospital). With respect to suits involving chil-
dren and the loss of consortium, see Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1972)
(denying claim for loss of consortium by children resulting from injury to mother). See generally
Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's Action for
Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 ARiz. ST. L.i. 1321 (1992) (advocating need for broader recogni-
tion of parental consortium claims).
The available empirical evidence suggests that the volume of tort litigation has not increased
substantially over the past few decades, at least in comparison to other types of litigation. See
Roxanne Barton Conlin, Litigation Explosion Disputed, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1991, at 26.
9. In the late twentieth century, considerable publicity and concern has attended the
increasing frequency of large tort verdicts. While there were fewer than twenty verdicts
of a million dollars or more in the nineteen sixties, more than three hundred and eighty
verdicts awarded a million dollars or more between 1970 and the beginning of 1981.
The year 1979 alone saw eighty awards in the million dollar range.
MARsHALL S. SHApo, TowAmS A JURISPRUDEFiNCE OF INJuRY: THE CONTNIG CREATION OF A
SYsTEM OF SuBsTANTivE JUSTICE IN AmEcRAN TORT LAW 5-163 (1984) (footnote ommitted).
10. 'Even adjusted for inflation (in 1986 dollars) the pre-Sullivan average award was 400%
to 500% lower than the average libel award of the mid-1980's." LDRC Recap and Update: Trial
Results, Damage Awards and Appeals, 1980-1989 and 1990-1991: The "Chilling Effect" Writ
Large ... Then Writ Larger, LDRC BuLLEIN (Libel Defense Resource Center, New York, N.Y.),
July 31, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter LDRC Recap]. "When jury trials were lost [by defendants] in the
most recent two-year period, the average award increased dramatically to more than $9 million
($9,066,310), compared to less than $1.5 million for the prior decade. The median award also
skyrocketed-to 1.5 million, compared to the decade-long figure of $200,000.' Id. at 4.
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Both the proposed Act and the Correction Act represent efforts at such re-
form. This Article examines the extent to which these proposals succeed
and considers whether other remedies would better protect both speech and
reputation.
II. THE PROBLEM
Problems with the law of defamation have been the subject of exten-
sive discussion and commentary." Without belaboring the point, these
problems may be summarized as follows.
A. The Law of Defamation Is Archaic
Much of the law of defamation is feudal in origin. Indeed, the very
term "defamation" represents an effort to embrace two torts-libel and
slander-that evolved from the separate, and sometimes warring, jurisdic-
tions of the royal and ecclesiastical courts. 2 In an age of broadcast and
cable communications and on-line information services, the effort to main-
tain a distinction between these two torts serves no useful purpose. Simi-
larly, the distinctions between slander and slander per sel3 and libel and
libel per quod 14 have also outlived their usefulness. To be sure, the lan-
guage' 5 is picturesque, but the niceties of pleading in this area are all too
representative of the obscure incantations for which lawyers have been jus-
tifiably criticized.' 6
11. For collections of previous scholarly work on this subject, see Robert M. Ackerman,
Defamation and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Healing the Sting, 1986 Mo. J. Disp. REsOL. 1, 3
n.10; David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. Rv. 487, 488 n.3
(1991). For a recent collection of articles of particular relevance to the proposed Act, see RE.
FORMING LiBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992).
12. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 772
(5th ed. 1984). Recent cases involving televangelists Jimmy Swaggart and Jerry Falwell may
suggest a renewed need for ecclesiastical jurisdiction. See Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So. 2d 915
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 530 So. 2d 571 (La. 1988); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988).
13. See KEarON Fr AL., supra note 12, § 112, at 188 (defining types of slander considered
actionable). Does slander per se treatment of statements regarding unchastity in a woman, but not
in a man, offend equal rights? See Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 125 (D. Md.
1974) (answering in the negative), vacated on other grounds, 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976). Has
AIDS replaced leprosy as a "loathsome disease" (another category that has traditionally received
slander per se treatment, see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) ON TORTS § 572 (1976)), or are we now too
enlightened to attach a social stigma to any disease?
14. For a description of this distinction, see KEETON Er AL., supra note 12, § 112, at 796.
15. The language includes such rococo terms as "colloquium," "inducement," and
"innuendo."
16. As early as 1726, Jonathan Swift stated that lawyers "hath a peculiar Cant and Jargon of
their own, that no other Mortal can understand, and wherein all their Laws are written, which they
take special Care to multiply; whereby they have gone near to confound the very Essence of Truth
1994] BRINGING COHERENCE TO DEFAMATION LAW 297
B. The Law of Defamation Is Complex
Superimposed upon the common law system is a relatively new law of
constitutional privileges created by the 1964 Sullivan decision and its prog-
eny. Necessary as it might have been, the Court's grafting of federal consti-
tutional limitations onto a cause of action previously considered a matter of
state-made common law has rendered the law of defamation quite complex.
Decisions delivered since 1964 have created a maze of categories and sub-
categories envisioned by neither the framers of the Constitution nor the Sul-
livan majority.' 7 Various rules now apply, depending on the type of
plaintiff involved (public official, public figure, or private individual),"8 the
context of the defamatory statement (i.e., whether or not the statement is
one of public concern),' 9 and possibly, the identity of the defendant (media
or non-media).20 These classifications further complicate a system that al-
ready distinguishes between the written and spoken word-with varying
jurisdictional treatment of broadcast communication 2-and between lan-
guage actionable and non-actionable per se. If this system sounds unduly
complicated, it is.
and Falsehood, of Right and Wrong...." JONATHAN SwIFr, GuLLrvER's TRAvs.s 175 (Running
Press Book Publishers 1992) (1726).
17. One commentator noted in 1981 that "the Court, inadvertently, has structured a bewilder-
ing labyrinth where even the mighty Theseus would yield to despair." Alexander D. Del Russo,
Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25
ST. Louis U. L.J. 501, 501 (1981).
18. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332-48 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964). Gertz held, inter alia, that while the Sullivan "actual
malice" rule embraces public figures as well as public officials, plaintiffs who fall into neither
category need not prove actual malice, but are constitutionally required to prove fault in order to
recover damages. Il at 345-48. Gertz further held that all plaintiffs, regardless of status, must
meet the actual malice requirement to be awarded presumed or punitive damages. Id at 348-50.
19. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985), the
Court held that the Gertz "actual malice" requirement for presumed and punitive damages does
not apply to matters that are not of public concern.
20. In Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 418, 421 (Vt.
1983), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Vermont Supreme Court upheld a judg-
ment for presumed and punitive damages in the absence of actual malice on the grounds that the
Gertz holding was limited to cases involving media defendants. While this rationale did not serve
as the basis for the United States Supreme Court's ultimate decision, see supra note 19, (in fact,
Justice Brennan, dissenting, took pains to count noses-indicating a rejection of this distinction,
472 U.S. at 775-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting)), subsequent cases indicate that the Court has re-
served judgment on this issue. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
776-78 (1985) (limiting its requirement that private-figure plaintiffs prove defamatory speech is
false to publications by media defendants regarding matters of public concern).
21. Compare, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480-81 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1956)
(holding that communication by radio is libel), aft'd, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957),
appeal denied, 170 N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) with CAL. CIVrI CODE § 46 (West 1982)
(establishing that radio communication is slander).
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FIGURE 1: ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION2 2
Defamatory statement.23 If not facially defamatory, must also show:
Inducement (extrinsic facts necessary to convey defamatory meaning);
24
Innuendo (explanation of defamatory meaning in light of extrinsic facts).25
Common law Colloquium (statement is of and concerning plaintiff).
2 6
requirements ]Publication of statement to third party.27
If slander: special damages, or circumstances making statement slander
per se.
28
Plaintiff! Public Not matter of
Subject Matter:. official/figure Private individual public concern
Falsity (Phil News. v. Hepps) ?29
(limited to media defendants?)
Constitutional Actual malice Fault ? (but see
requirements (Sullivan,30  (Gertz)32  White cc inGertz)3 1  (ltd. to media defs?) Dun & Bradst.)33
For presumed or Actual malice Actual malice No actual malice
punitive damages (Sullivan, Gertz)
3 4  (Gertz)35  (Dun & Bradst.)
36
Figure 1, set forth above, represents an attempt to summarize the
elements presently required for a prima facie case of defamation. 37 The
question marks that adorn the figure demonstrate that the legal doctrine
22. See KEEMrN ur AL., supra note 12, § 111, at 771-93.
23. "A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
24. KE=rON r AL., supra note 12, § 111, at 782.
25. Id. at 782-83.
26. Id. at 783.
27. Id. at 771.
28. Id. at 788, 793.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974).
32. Id. at 345-48.
33. In his concurrence in Dun and Bradstreet, Justice White suggested that the Gertz
requirement of fault had been completely eliminated in cases not involving matters of public
concern. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White,
J., concurring in the judgment).
34. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-45.
35. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50.
36. See supra note 19.
37. For a summary of the constitutional requirements pertaining to defamation actions, see
infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
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which has emerged to date remains far from clear and that further
refinements may arise in the future.
C. The Law of Defamation Is Uncertain and Confusing
The intricacies of pleading and proving defamation have rendered this
area of law obscure to all but specialists in the field. Although a boon to
those of us who teach and write in the area, this uncertainty does little to
inspire those who believe that law exists to serve the public, not the legal
profession. Law ought to be accessible;38 the law of defamation is not. In
short, defamation is an area of case-dominated law, much in need of
codification.
The collective intake of breath immediately preceding any United
States Supreme Court pronouncement affecting the law of defamation un-
derscores both the law's uncertainty and the potential ramifications of the
Court's decisions in this area. Zigzagging from Gertz to Dun & Brad-
street39 to Falwell40 to Milkovich,41 the Court has plotted an uncertain and
unsteady path, owing more to the Court's shifting politics than to consistent
legal analysis.42 By now, the trend is clear: there is no trend.
D. The Law of Defamation Is Expensive.
Uncertainty and complexity in the law typically lead to more appeals,
fewer settlements, and the prolongation of litigation. Charting an unsteady
38. David Dudley Field, an early proponent of codification, said:
And last, but not least, of all the benefits of a code, is the diffusion among the
people of a knowledge of the laws under which they live, and to which they must con-
form their conduct. Here, more than anywhere else in the world, is it needful that the
people should know the law. They are supposed to make it. They, at least, are responsi-
ble for it. They, by their agents, administer it and execute it.
David D. Field, Reasons for the Adoption of the Codes, in I SPEEcHEs, ARGUMENTS AND MIScL.-
LANEous PAPERS OF DAVID DuDLEY FmID 361, 372 (A.P. Sprague el., 1884) (address given
before the Judiciary Committee of the two houses of the New York Legislature on February 19,
1873).
39. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974), the Court held, inter alia, that
a plaintiff could not recover presumed or punitive damages without proving actual malice. Later,
in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985), the Court limited
Gertz to "matters of public concern," allowing recovery of punitive damages in other cases with-
out actual malice.
40. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988), the Court denied a nationally
known minister's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of a showing
of actual malice.
41. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990), the Court refused to find a
separate constitutional privilege for opinion beyond that already provided through existing privi-
leges. It held that a libel claim arising from charges made in a signed sports column was actiona-
ble. Il at 23.
42. Judging by Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Falwell (which drew no dissent), the
basic holding of Sullivan appears to be sacrosanct. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55-56.
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course, the Supreme Court has provided wisps of hope to both sides of the
defamation battle, thereby fueling additional litigation. These cases typi-
cally result in victories for plaintiffs at the trial level, but success for de-
fendants on appeal.43 Damages have, quite plainly, gotten out of hand.
Multimillion dollar verdicts are the norm, yet the proportion of these ver-
dicts ultimately collected, after expensive post-trial motions and appeals, is
relatively low.'
All this litigation costs money, especially for defendants, who pay by
the hour for legal services. As a result, defendants effectively lose even
when they ultimately prevail in litigation.45 Plaintiffs, even those who ob-
tain representation on a contingent fee basis, frequently lose in another,
more personal way, as cases grind on interminably, with little hope of dam-
ages or vindication in sight.46 A Bleak House mentality prevails.47 The
intensity of feeling on the part of plaintiffs who feel that they have been
maligned as well as defendants indisposed to compromise their First
Amendment rights further fan the flames of litigation. Fear and loathing
abound.48
43. The success of plaintiffs at trial and defendants on appeal is documented in the following:
Marc A. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1983); Marc A. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B.
FouND. RES. J. 795, 804-07; LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at 3-4.
44. Media defendants have had high rates of success in overturning plaintiffs' verdicts; the
majority of these unfavorable awards are either reversed, remanded or substantially reduced.
LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at 11-14. The Libel Defense Resource Center reports that of the
total damages initially awarded during the previous decade, only 7.2% were ultimately paid in the
form of finally affirmed judgments. LDRC RELEAs, August 26, 1992, at 3-4.
45. A graphic illustration of this phenomenon is Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567
N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991). In this case, the editor of a small scholarly journal incurred in excess of
one million dollars in legal expenses while "successfully" defending a suit brought by a large
corporation. Summary judgment was ultimately granted, but not until the case reached the New
York Court of Appeals, seven years after the action was commenced. A more detailed description
of this litigation can be found in ANTHoNY LEins, MAKE No LAW: Tim SULLIVAN CASE AND Tm
FIRST A.msNom'rr 211-14 (1991).
46. To rephrase a metaphor widely attributed General William P. Westmoreland, no stranger
to defamation litigation himself, there is no light at the end of this tunnel.
47. Charles Dickens's classic novel, Bleak House, portrayed the interminable case of
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, which ground on for generation after generation. CHARLES DICKENs,
BLEAK HousE 456 (George Ford & Sylvere Monod eds., Norton 1977) (1853).
48. In this atmosphere, defamation has thus far proved to be infertile ground for alternative
methods of dispute resolution. A potentially helpful and farsighted dispute resolution procedure
has been established by the Iowa Libel Research Project (ILRP). In 1987, the ILRP implemented
the Libel Dispute Resolution Program (LDRP), a voluntary program employing mediation and
fact-finding in an effort to set the record straight and avoid the expense and rancor of conventional
libel litigation. Thus far, the program appears to be underutilized. During a three year research
phase, contacts with lawyers in 128 disputes produced only five agreements to use the program.
One possible explanation of low utilization may be that most disputes were too far advanced for
the parties to turn back and repair the damage; another is that attorneys (who, for the most part,
appeared to control the litigation) were unaccustomed to resolving disputes through a procedure
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E. The Law of Defamation Lends Itself to Perverse Results
Because of the foregoing problems, defamation litigation becomes not
so much a battle over truth or falsity, but a high stakes crap game in which
the costs of litigation transcend the harm caused by the initial defamatory
publication. As the reporter to the Drafting Committee for the proposed
Act suggested, defendants lose by winning, plaintiffs win by suing, and the
most heavily litigated issues bear little relation to the interests of the par-
ties.4 9 This is so because the overlay of constitutional protections, the issue
of fault-actual malice in cases involving public officials or figures, negli-
gence in most cases involving others-dominates defamation litigation.
Plaintiffs who fail to recover damages claim that they failed "due to a tech-
nicality," i.e. the constitutional requirement of fault."0 Having garnered
publicity through the very act of suing, plaintiffs, regardless of the outcome,
are able to call the defamatory statement into question, and thus win by
suing."1 Defendants and their insurers, increasingly wary about litigation
costs, have come to settle an increasing proportion of their cases, notwith-
standing the heavy burden of proof imposed on defamation plaintiffs.52
Meanwhile, some plaintiffs who have been unfairly maligned are deprived
of any remedy due to the difficulty of proving fault.53 Issues of truth or
falsity, fairness, and redress for injury are lost in the gamesmanship that
dominates this tort like no other.
54
that made no provision for damages. Rosselle L. Wissler et al., Resolving Libel Disputes out of
Court: The Libel Dispute Resolution Program, in REFoRMING LmE LAW 286, 294, 300 (John
Soloski and Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992); see also World Arbitration and Mediation Report,
Vol. 2 No. 12, at 324 (Dec. 1991) (describing limited success of program).
49. RANAL P. BEZANSON Er AL., LmnE LAW AND Ta PRESS 3, 79-82, 112, 182 (1987);
Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71
IowA L. Rnv. 226, 226, 228, 232-33 (1985).
50. Of course, viewers of Hollywood police dramas will recognize that this is not the first
time a constitutional requirement has been described as a mere "technicality."
51. BEZaNsoN Er AL., supra note 49, at 92-94.
52. Many are driven to settle libel claims rather than undergo protracted and expensive litiga-
tion with the ultimate risk of having to pay large damages. See LEwIs, supra note 45, at 203
(1991).
53. Quite obviously, a plaintiff who has been defamed inaccurately, but who cannot recover
in the absence of fault, bears the burden of an injury without a remedy. Such a plaintiff can be
likened to the accident victim who fails to overcome the fault hurdle in a personal injury case.
The difference is that in defamation, the means to eradicate much of the injury are frequently
available to the defendant at little cost. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43, 218.
54. To Alexander Meiklejohn's 1964 observation that the Sullivan opinion was "an occasion
for dancing in the streets," commentator Anthony Lewis has added a more sobering contemporary
view:
Both the press and public-spirited individual citizens found themselves battered by libel
claims and litigation costs that punished their expression as the Sullivan case had
seemed to promise it would not be punished. For plaintiffs, too-those who felt genu-
inely wounded by what they considered false criticism-the libel process was frustrat-
ing. The dancing had stopped.
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If anything is clear about the law of defamation, it is that there is a
need for clarification, streamlining, and simplification. The law also cries
out for remedies more closely in tune with the legitimate interests of the
parties: plaintiffs' interests in protecting their reputations and defendants'
interests in protecting their First Amendment rights.5 The divergence in
the law of the several states, along with common constitutional require-
ments, suggests to some that uniform rules are desirable.5 6 These needs
appear to have informed the Drafting Committee as it went about its work.
The extent to which its efforts have succeeded in addressing these concerns
is the focus of the balance of this Article.
I. THE PROPOSED UNIFoRM DEFAMATION Acr
The proposed Uniform Defamation Act was a relatively long docu-
ment, at least compared to most tort legislation or even most proposed defa-
mation legislation.57 Both the proposed Act and its descendant, the
Correction Act, are products of a scholarly drafting committee, learned in
the law of defamation, which carefully considered every nuance and at-
tempted to anticipate most every contingency.58
The proposed Act included thirty-two sections, divided into five arti-
cles. Together, they formed a comprehensive codification of an updated
law of defamation while avoiding certain types of invasion of privacy and
trade libel. In light of the extensive effort and careful thought that went into
Lwis, supra note 45, at 200, 218.
55. Anderson, supra note 11, at 489.
56. Professor Anderson recently suggested:
Libel is a field that cries out for some uniformity. Today intrastate speech is even rarer
than intrastate commerce. Defamers are rarely subject to one state's law, and unless
they are, they must tailor their speech to the least protective state law to which they may
be subject.
Id. at 553.
57. Together with prefatory note and comments, the March, 1993 draft took up 43 typewrit-
ten pages. Compare this with Professor Marc Franklin's proposed "Plaintiffs Option Libel Re-
form Act," Frankin, supra note 3, at 812-813, and H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), and a
bill introduced in the United States Congress in 1985 by Representative Charles E. Schumer
(D-N.Y.) (each consisting of five sections occupying two to three pages). Of course, we dare not
compare proposed defamation legislation to such magnum opi as the Internal Revenue Code. Tort
lawyers will readily concede that when it comes to prolixity, their brethren in the tax field are the
champions. One of the infirmities of the tax law, however, is the need to retain well-paid legal
counsel in order to take maximum advantage of its myriad provisions. The same infinmity should
not afflict the law of defamation. The law should not be the exclusive province of those wealthy
enough to retain permanent legal representation.
58. In addition to Deans Perlman and Bezanson (Chair and Reporter, respectively), the Draft-
ing Committee members were Hon. Jack Davies (St. Paul, Minnesota), Lewis C. Green (St. Louis,
Missouri), John F. Hayes (Hutchinson, Kansas), Kathryn L. Hove (Solon, Iowa), Elmer R. Oet-
tinger (Chapel Hill, North Carolina), Matthew S. Rae, Jr. (Los Angeles, California), Hon. Freder-
ick P. Stamp, Jr. (Wheeling, West Virginia), Dwight A. Hamilton (Denver, Colorado), William J.
Pierce (Ann Arbor, Michigan), and Hon. David Peeples (San Antonio, Texas).
1994] BRINGING COHERENCE TO DEFAMATION LAW 303
the proposed Act, it is only fair to examine its provisions and consider
which are salvagable, which are not, and why the bulk of it was withdrawn
from consideration.
A. Streamlining Features
The proposed Act included several streamlining features that would
have simplified and clarified defamation law without compromising impor-
tant values. I briefly discuss them here in the hope that they might be re-
vived sometime in the future.
1. First, Some Housecleaning
Three sensible features appeared near the beginning of the proposed
Act. First, section 2-101 of the Act, read together with the definitions pro-
vided in section 1-101, eliminated the archaic distinction between libel and
slander, replacing them with a single action for defamation.59 Second, no
special provision was made for claims actionable per se, nor was any
needed with the elimination of the libel/slander distinction. Instead, under
the proposed Act, a person would have been subjectlto liability to another
person for defamation if "the person caused the publication of a false and
defamatory factual statement about the other person which harmed that per-
son's reputation."60 Actual harm to reputation would have been necessary;
"special" harm would not have been.6 '
Finally, the proposed Act made no distinction between media and
non-media defendants. The comments to section 2-101 indicated that any
such distinction, real or imagined, was to be avoided. This, too, would have
been welcome. Clearly, you and I should have the right to discuss on the
street comer in the afternoon what The New York Times has published on its
front page that morning.6 2 Thus, whether written or spoken, printed or
59. The comment to PROPosED UNiU. DEFAMATION Acr, supra note 4, § 2-101 stated, in part,
"[N]o distinction is made between slander and libel. The distinction is now largely anachronistic,
and the rules of liability per se and related requirements for proof of harm and damage that turned
on the distinction are not retained in the Act."
60. Id. § 2-101.
61. Under the common law, slander is not actionable in the absence of "special" harm, that
is, some kind of out-of-pocket loss on the part of the plaintiff. KEToN ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 112, at 793. An exception arises if the case involves one of the four categories of "slander per
se." In some jurisdictions, libel is not actionable without special harm unless the statement is
libelous on its face. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D. Pa.
1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), a'd, 403 U.S. 29(1971); Robinson v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 159 S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (N.C. 1968). Neither of these requirements appears to be constitu-
tionally mandated; rather, they are artifacts of a medieval system that predated radio, television,
the photocopier and the fax machine.
62. Throughout this Article, the term "freedom of speech" is used, rather than the more limit-
ing term, "freedom of the press." I view the former inclusive of the latter for the reason suggested
in the text accompanying this note.
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broadcast, whispered between friends or shouted from the rooftops, all
methods of speech would have been treated in the same manner.63 These
reforms are clearly long overdue. '
2. Burdens of Persuasion: Greater Consistency
Early drafts of the proposed Act retained the odd assortment of bur-
dens of persuasion created by the decisions in Sullivan and its progeny.65
Under section 3 of the February 6, 1992 Draft, the plaintiff would have
been required to prove publication, defamation, harm to reputation, and fal-
sity by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the plaintiff would have
had to prove abuse of privilege, negligence, and knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth by clear and convincing evidence. The March,
1993 Draft adopted a "clear and convincing" standard as to proof of "fal-
sity, publication beyond the scope of privilege, negligence, knowing falsity
or reckless disregard of the truth, intent to injure and ill will." It reverted to
a preponderance standard "on all other questions of fact."
65
Clearly, no constitutional infirmity attaches to applying the more strin-
gent "clear and convincing" standard to the issue of falsity. Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which a jury could fail to find falsity
by clear and convincing evidence, but could nevertheless find that a pub-
lisher was at fault with respect to falsity by clear and convincing evi-
dence.67 At the very least, an assortment of standards invites confusion on
the part of the jury. While a reasonable argument could be made for a
63. The proposed Act also took the sensible step of treating information retrieval services as
secondary publishers not ordinarily subject to liability, certainly a forward-looking and sensible
step in an age dependent on quick conveyance and retrieval of information. PROPOSED UNw.
DEFAMAIAON Act, supra note 4, § 2-110. These publishers are the computer age equivalent of the
newsstand vendor or book store operator, and should be accorded the same protection.
64. The law of damages can account for the differences in harm produced by different meth-
ods of speech. A defamatory statement published by a national news magazine would likely result
in far greater injury than a defamatory statement communicated orally between friends, and the
jury's damage award should reflect this distinction without any need for special categories.
65. In Sullivan, the Court stated that "actual malice" must be shown with "convincing clar-
ity." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984), the Court held that, consistent with Sullivan, issues of constitutional fact, such as
actual malice, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 511. Bose also established
a heightened standard of review of actual malice findings. Id. at 499. In Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986), the Court established that, at least in cases involv-
ing media defendants and matters of public concern, the plaintiff had the burden of proving falsity
by a preponderance of the evidence.
66. PROPOSED UiN,. DEFAMATION AcT, supra note 4, § 2-106. The proposed Act therefore
established identical standards for proof of the constitutionally mandated actual malice and the
"garden variety" malice additionally required (under § 2-103, Alternative B) for recovery of puni-
tive damages.
67. Put another way, if it is not clear to the jury that the statement was false, how could the
defendant be found at fault for believing it to be true?
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preponderance standard as to truth,68 the Drafting Committee made the bet-
ter choice.69
3. Privileges: All Together
The proposed Act took a rational approach with regard to privileges
that exist under the common law. Sections 2-107 and 2-108 listed the abso-
lute and conditional privileges applicable to defamation actions. 70  These
comprehensive lists, incorporated only after debate as to whether privileges
should be left to the common law, 71 again represented a laudable streamlin-
ing effort.72 While case law will always play a role in fleshing out the
details, there is no reason to keep the privileges tucked away in West's
Regional Reporter system, lurking as traps for the unwary.
4. Punitive Damages: Going, Going, But Not Gone
Tort defendants generally, and defamation defendants particularly, la-
ment the wide discretion reposed in juries with respect to the assessment of
damages.73 Punitive damages play a particularly invidious role in defama-
68. In Hepps, Justice O'Connor reasoned that when the issue of truth or falsity cannot be
resolved conclusively, the Constitution requires that the scales be tipped in favor of protecting true
speech, even at the risk of protecting false speech. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776, 778. By focusing on
the situation in which the evidence was in equipoise, Justice O'Connor could not help but furnish
the minimal breathing room provided by the preponderance standard.
69. Professor Franklin's proposal likewise adopted a uniform "clear and convincing" stan-
dard. Franklin, supra note 3, at 812-13.
70. Section 2-109 dealt with the conditional privilege mandated by the Constitution for state-
ments concerning public officials and public figures. This section is discussed infra, in text ac-
companying notes 80-82.
71. PROPOSED UNi. DEAMA-n7ON ACT, supra note 4, § 7-101 cmt. (Aug., 1991 Discussion
Draft).
72. While any action under the proposed Act was foreclosed if an absolute privilege (such as
a judicial or legislative privilege) was invoked, PRoPosED UNUF. DEFAMATION Act, supra note 4,
§ 2-107, only actions for damages were precluded by conditional privileges. Id. § 2-108. This
was consistent with the rationale supporting the Act's distinction between actions for damages and
actions for vindication. See infra text accompanying notes 89-93.
Consider two examples of the proposed Act's common-sense approach to privileges: the
spousal privilege and the fair report privilege. Under the act, communications between husband
and wife were considered absolutely privileged. PRoPosED UNi. DEFAMA-TON AcT, supra note 4,
§ 2-107(4). This sensible rule would have replaced the sexist common law fiction that such state-
ments involved no publication. Id. § 2-107 cmt. The fair report privilege, which applies to accu-
rate and fair reports of official actions or proceedings open to the public, was included among the
absolute privileges, a sensible standardization. l § 2-107(2). Some courts have treated this as a
qualified privilege. Id. § 2-108 cmt.
73. Justice O'Connor recently wrote:
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they
have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, how-
ever, they have a devastating potential for harm.... Juries are permitted to target un-
popular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth.
Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.
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tion actions: they penalize defendants in the absence of a countervailing
need for compensation on the part of plaintiffs; they raise the stakes of the
game (and therefore the resources used to obtain or defend those stakes) to
dizzying heights; most seriously, they give juries the opportunity to pun-
ish-and even eliminate 74 -a publication that dares to buck popular senti-
ment or publish items that have an unsettling effect on a majority of
readers.
The Drafting Committee initially attempted to eliminate the problem
by prohibiting punitive damages.75 Later, acting on instructions from the
Commissioners, the Committee drafted an alternative provision that would
have allowed punitives "only upon a showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the publication was made with knowledge of its falsity, intent to
injure the plaintiff, and ill will toward the plaintiff. '76 Still, prior to with-
drawal of the proposed Act, the Committee intended to advise strongly
against the allowance of punitive damages.7 7
Substitution of the Correction Act leaves punitive damages available in
the absence of a correction or clarification. 71 While this works as an incen-
tive for publishers to avail themselves of the Correction Act, it is an extor-
tionate incentive.79  The abolition of punitive damages should be a
component of any comprehensive defamation reform measure.
B. Some Clutter Remained
Although the above measures would have helped streamline or mod-
ernize defamation law, some clutter remained under the proposed Act.
Eliminating the possibility of damages predicated on strict liability, 0 it
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1056 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. So venerable an institution as The Saturday Evening Post may have been crippled by a
libel verdict. LEms, supra note 45, at 191 (commenting on Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967)).
75. PRoPosED UNi. DEFAMAT O N Acr, supra note 4, § 5-102 (August, 1991 Discussion
Draft). This provision was retained in PROPosED UNrip. DEFAMNIAoN Acr, supra note 4, § 2-103,
Alternative A (March 23, 1993 Discussion Draft).
76. PROPosED UNr. DEFAMA11ON ACr, supra note 4, § 2-103, Alternative B.
77. Id. § 2-103 cmt.
78. Under § 5 of the Correction Act, a timely and sufficient correction or clarification limits
the plaintiff's recovery to provable economic loss. See infra text accompanying note 141. In the
absence of a correction or clarification, both general and punitive damages remain available.
79. As long as destructive punitive damages are possible, there will be too great a temptation
for defendants to issue a "correction," even where the defamatory statement is accurate. See infra
text accompanying note 233.
80. PRosED UNw. DEFAMATiON AcT, supra note 4, § 2-101. Justice White's concurrence
in Dun & Bradstreet suggested that the fault requirement had been dispensed with in cases involv-
ing statements which are not a matter of public concern, thereby reviving the prospect of strict
liability for defamation. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774
(1985) (White, J., concurring). This was, of course, the rule in widespread use prior to Sullivan.
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nonetheless retained the distinction between public officials or figures and
private individuals in connection with an action for damages. Under the
proposed Act, a statement regarding a public official/figure enjoyed a "con-
ditional privilege" that was lost if the statement was "mrelated to the per-
son's status as a public official or public figure" or was "made with
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth."'" Where a con-
ditional privilege did not exist, i.e., in most defamation actions involving
private individuals, a negligence standard applied.
8 2
The proposed Act's distinction between classes of plaintiffs may be
constitutionally justified,83 but it is not constitutionally mandated. Under
Gertz, the states retained power to decide what level of protection was to be
accorded speech about private individuals, so long as there was no liability
for damages without fault.8 4 If, as the comments to the proposed Act indi-
cated, "all speech should be equally protected irrespective of context,"85
then all plaintiffs and defendants should be subject to the same burdens.8 6
The proposed Act would have eliminated that avenue of recovery, at least so far as a traditional
action for damages is involved.
81. PRoppsED UNw. D FmAsioN Acr, supra note 4, § 2-109; see also id. § 2-101(b)(1)
(defining the action for defamation using the same standard for a conditional privilege).
82. Id. § 2-101(b)(2). The proposed Act eliminated the confusing distinction between the
"actual malice" necessary to defeat the constitutional privilege of Sullivan and the garden variety,
"heart of darkness" malice, sometimes used to defeat the common law privileges. Id. § 2-108(b),
cmt.; cf. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 698-700 (Md. 1976) (applying a reckless
disregard standard to defeat a conditional privilege). As the comment to § 2-108 states, "[T]here
is little policy justification for treating common law and constitutional privileges differently .... "
83. Anthony Lewis has suggested that this distinction is grounded in the need to protect
persons from liability for what may be viewed as seditious libel or a libel of government. See
LEwis, supra note 45, at 140-99. This concern was evident in the special protection accorded
statements regarding public officials in Sullivan.
84. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). A few states have decided to
apply an "actual malice" standard to all cases of public or general interest. E.g., Walker v. Colo-
rado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo. 1975), overruled by Diversified Management,
Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982) (requiring a showing of knowledge of
serious doubt of truth under an actual malice standard); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co.
v. Northeast Publications Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (End. App. 1974).
85. PRoPosED UNri. DEEAmATION Acr, supra note 4, § 2-101 cimt.
86. This is especially the case if all plaintiffs are allowed to clear their names without any
showing of fault, through either the proposed Act's vindication remedy or a tripartite special
verdict. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90 and 105-15.
Justice Brennan has suggested that First Amendment principles are offended by a judicial
determination of whether or not speech is a matter of public concern. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 777-78 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The same prin-
ciples are similarly compromised when a public entity such as a court determines who is and who
is not a public figure (and therefore worthy of more or less reputational protection).
Perhaps the best rationale for retaining a distinction between public officials/figures and
other plaintiffs is the availability of self help to the former group. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 338-39
(suggesting that public officials and figures usually enjoy significantly greater "access to channels
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods" and therefore have a more realistic opportunity
to counteract false statements). Actual malice is quite difficult to prove, and while both the pro-
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Case law during the past twenty years has drifted away from the rationale
that supported the distinction created in Sullivan and Gertm8 7 The distinc-
tion between classes of plaintiffs and the consequent patchwork quilt of
legal rules have tormented the courts since 1964. Further streamlining of
the law is in order.
C. The Vindication Remedy
By far the most controversial feature of the proposed Act was the "vin-
dication remedy" provided for in Article In. 88 This remedy would have
allowed plaintiffs to "obtain a written and published finding of fact on the
question of falsity, but without the opportunity for any form of money dam-
ages."8 9 Plaintiffs would have been allowed to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment to clear their names simply by proving a false and defamatory factual
statement without having to prove fault, as is constitutionally required in
most defamation cases involving money damages. 90 On its face, the vindi-
cation remedy would have provided just what was needed by plaintiffs who
had been defamed falsely but non-negligently: the opportunity to set the
record straight and redeem their good names. At the same time, the vindi-
cation remedy likely would have protected from crushing damage awards
those defendants who, in the absence of fault, had presumably proceeded in
good faith.
posed Act and this Article have suggested a no-fault vindication remedy for all plaintiffs, the
media are less likely to publicize a vindication award when a private plaintiff is involved. Given
the relative ease, however, with which juries find negligence in defamation cases and the diffi-
culty in distinguishing private figures from public ones in close cases, the undesirable conse-
quences of this distinction far outweigh its value. See Franklin, supra note 3, at 823-24.
87. Why, for example, should the actual malice requirement apply to a supermarket tabloid's
description of a show business personality's conduct in a restaurant, see Burnett v. National En-
quirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), but not to a United States Senator's
public ridicule of a government grant recipient? See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
133-36 (1979).
88. The vindication remedy had its antecedents in proposals such as those of Professor Marc
Franklin, the Annenberg Project, and Representative Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Professor Frank-
lin proposed a declaratory judgment alternative to a defamation action that could be instigated at
the plaintiff's option. Franklin, supra note 3 at 812-19. The Annenberg Project recommended a
no-fault, no damages alternative that could be triggered at the option of either the plaintiff or the
defendant in a libel action. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 3 at 32-35. The Schumer bill, H.R.
2846, 99th Cong., ist Sess. (1985), was similarly constructed. See Franklin, supra note 3 at
832-35.
Intense opposition to the proposed Act's vindication remedy surfaced almost immediately,
and ultimately led to its withdrawal in favor of the less controversial Correction Act. Notwith-
standing withdrawal of the proposed Act, the history of proposals for a no-fault, no damages
vindication action suggests that such a remedy may remain grist for the analytical mill during the
years ahead.
89. PRoPosED UNi. DEFAMATION Acr, supra note 4, § 3-101 cmt.
90. Fault may not be required in cases involving statements that are not "matters of public
concern." See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring).
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Although there is little certainty in defamation law, a remedy provid-
ing for a declaratory judgment as to a false and defamatory statement with-
out a showing of fault would likely have passed constitutional muster. The
Sullivan and Gertz holdings require fault for the recovery of damages;91 the
Hepps requirement that the plaintiff undertake the burden of proving falsity
was retained by the vindication remedy. Professor David A. Anderson has
recently suggested that "if the remedies are less burdensome on speech, the
constitutional limitations can be less burdensome on plaintiffs."92 The
Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet holdings appear to have embraced this view.93
Still, some aspects of the proposed Act's vindication remedy may have
been constitutionally suspect. For example, the vindication provisions pro-
vided that, if the plaintiff prevailed, the defendant was required (at the de-
fendant's option) to either publish the court's findings as to falsity or pay
the plaintiff an amount sufficient to secure their publication.94 Such a pro-
vision, while perhaps fair and sensible, may have run afoul of the First
Amendment, because it would have required either a mandatory publication
or damages without proof of fault.95 In addition, the proposed Act allowed
recovery of attorney's fees by plaintiffs who had successfully pursued the
vindication remedy, when "the defendant had no reasonable basis to refuse
a timely correction or clarification."96 Although this provision would ap-
pear to pass federal constitutional muster in cases involving private plain-
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
92. Anderson, supra note 11, at 537.
93. Gertz allows non-public figure plaintiffs to recover actual, but not presumed or punitive
damages, in the absence of actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49. Dun & Bradstreet allows
the recovery of presumed and punitive damages without actual malice where the speech does not
involve matters of public concern, and First Amendment considerations are therefore presumed to
be of less importance. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759-61.
94. PRoPosED U~rm. DEFAMAMON Acr, supra note 4, § 3-103(a).
95. In Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56, 258 (1974), a Florida right of reply
statute was struck down by the Supreme Court on grounds that the First Amendment would be
violated if the government were to tell the press what it must print. Although the proposed Act
would have allowed a defendant to avoid an order to publish the court's findings by payment of an
amount sufficient to secure publication elsewhere, such payment might have been considered
damages in violation of the fault requirements of Sullivan and Gertz. Whether or not the relatively
small amount necessary to secure publication of the court's findings would have passed muster
under Professor Anderson's theory of relative burdens is open to conjecture. The proposed Act
might therefore have been seen as giving defendants a choice between the Scylla of one unconsti-
tutional burden and the Charybdis of another.
No constitutional infirmity would attach to a voluntary agreement between plaintiff and de-
fendant to limit a fact-finding process to the issue of truth and for the defendant to thereafter
publish the findings of fact. I suggested an out-of-court remedy of this type in an earlier article.
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 20-23. The Iowa Libel Research Project has pioneered a voluntary
program constructed along similar lines, with limited acceptance. See supra note 48.
96. PRosED UNW. DEFAmAToN Acr, supra note 4, § 3-104(1).
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tiffs,9 7 it would have invited precisely the type of evidence, and along with
it the extensive discovery, that the vindication remedy was designed to
avoid. With respect to public official/figure plaintiffs, an award of attor-
ney's fees on a negligence basis might have violated the actual malice re-
quirements of Sullivan and Gertz.9" Generally speaking, fee-shifting is a
rare occurrence in American tort law, and it is especially difficult to justify
an award of attorney's fees against a party for tortious speech, particularly
where it is unaccompanied by a showing of actual malice on the part of the
alleged tortfeasor.99 Fee-shifting on a no-fault basis is therefore suspect, if
not constitutionally, then in the context of general principles of tort law. t°°
Plaintiffs as well as defendants may have been shortchanged by the
vindication remedy. The proposed Act might have relegated plaintiffs to a
Hobson's choice of either (a) a vindication remedy offering little in the way
of damages, or (b) an action for damages in which there would be no vindi-
cation absent proof of fault. 0 1 Because this choice would have necessarily
been made before the plaintiff had an opportunity to obtain discovery as to
97. This is because it required a negligence determination as a precondition to a fee award,
and was thereby consistent with the fault requirement of Gertz.
98. See supra note 19. To suggest that attorney's fees and expenses are not truly "damages"
under Sullivan and Gertz, when such fees can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars, elevates
semantics over reality. Indeed, in most cases the amount awarded for attorney's fees would likely
exceed any amount awarded to secure publication of the court's findings under § 3-103(a) of the
proposed Act.
99. The fault requirements of Sullivan and Gertz may be viewed as having simply aligned the
law of defamation with that of the law of torts generally. Ironically, just as the fault concept was
being introduced to defamation law through constitutional mandate, state courts were becoming
more willing to apply strict liability concepts to other areas of tort law, such as products liability
and misrepresentation. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901
(Cal. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A and 402B (1965). Subsequent case law
has demonstrated that "strict" products liability may not be quite as strict as had been imagined.
See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1985) (reverting to a negligence
standard in design defect cases); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. Rnv. 593, 618-36
(1980) (reviewing the use of risk-utility analysis in strict liability cases). The greater willingness
of the courts to apply strict liability to misrepresentation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552C (1965), may raise additional First Amendment concerns, as misrepresentation, like defa-
mation, also involves speech. Perhaps the commercial nature of most such speech lowers the level
of protection. But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
511-14 (1984) (applying Sullivan considerations to defamatory language in a commercial
context).
100. Notwithstanding the urgings of some groups (most notably former Vice President
Quayle's Competitiveness Council) to encourage the shifting of fees to unsuccessful tort litigants,
I remain concerned about the chilling effect such a move would have on good faith litigants on
both sides. More supportable is the shifting of fees upon a showing of bad faith, as measured by
an objective standard, like "actual malice" on the part of a defendant. See infra notes 242-43 and
accompanying text.
101. Of course, this choice would not be particularly painful for the plaintiff who cared only
for vindication, and who would not have sought damages even if they were legally available. It is
unclear whether many such plaintiffs exist, at least once the warpaint of litigation has been ap-
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fault, and thereby make an informed assessment of the likelihood of pre-
vailing in an action for damages, the problem would have been
exacerbated. 102
The vindication remedy encountered harsh criticism from media repre-
sentatives, largely because they viewed it as a new outlet for plaintiffs pre-
viously blocked by the fault requirements set forth in prior case law."0 3 Of
greater concern to this observer, however, was that the proposed Act pro-
vided no disincentive for plaintiffs who had been truthfully defamed, but
nevertheless hoped to "win by suing," a pattern of conduct suggested by at
least one major study."w These plaintiffs, unable to prove falsity (but per-
haps hoping to strike it lucky with a large damage award), would have
avoided the vindication remedy and continued to pursue the traditional ac-
tion for money damages. As in pre-Act cases, they would have attributed
lack of success in such an action to failing on a "technicality," that is, the
inability to prove fault. Due to the absence of attorney's fees for successful
defendants, no penalties would have attached to the plaintiff's inability to
prove falsity; indeed, in the absence of a special verdict, there would have
been no explicit finding on the falsity issue. Thus, under the proposed Act,
"bad" plaintiffs (who were truthfully defamed) would have had no incentive
to behave any differently than they do currently, while "good" plaintiffs
(who were falsely defamed) may have had insufficient incentive to elect the
vindication remedy.
plied. See supra note 48 (discussing the lukewarm response to a voluntary program offering only
a vindication remedy).
102. Some plaintiffs might have chosen the vindication action, concerned that they would lose
out entirely had they been unable to prove fault. Unfortunately, the proposed Act required plain-
tiffs to make this election at the time of the filing of the complaint, before any opportunity for
discovery. See PRoPosED U w. DEFAMAMTON Acr, supra note 4, § 3-101.
While the plaintiff is most likely to have the best knowledge of the truth or falsity of a
defamatory statement-after all, who knows better than the plaintiff whether she has indeed done
what she has reportedly done?-the defendant is most likely to know whether fault exists. Only
through discovery can the plaintiff ascertain the defendant's knowledge at the time of publication,
and therefore establish fault. This was the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160-69 (1979), which allowed a public figure plaintiff to engage in exten-
sive newsroom discovery despite a media defendant's claim of privilege.
Of course, the goal of judicial economy would have been served by the vindication action.
Because fault was irrelevant in the vindication action, discovery as to negligence or, in the case of
public officials/figures, actual malice would probably have been precluded. Time would have
been saved and the intrusive newsroom discovery allowed under Herbert would have been elimi-
nated. The problem is that if plaintiffs had been forced to make a premature choice, they would
have been likely to elect the remedy providing the greater recovery. The vindication remedy
would have simply been avoided by competently represented plaintiffs.
103. See, e.g., Boisfeuillet Jones, Jr., Comments of The Washington Post on the Proposed
Uniform Defamation Act at 2-3 (Oct. 1, 1992); Testimony of Sam D. Kennedy on behalf of the
National Newspaper Association and the Tennessee Press Association at 3 (Drafting Committee
hearing, Washington, D.C., Oct. 9, 1992).
104. See supra note 48 for information on the Iowa study.
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D. A Better Way: The Tripartite Verdict
The idea of giving plaintiffs an opportunity to vindicate themselves
without proving the fault required under the Constitution to obtain damages
remains an appealing one. 105 However, courts can accord this opportunity
simply by employing, in connection with the traditional action for damages,
the tripartite special verdict pioneered by former United States District
Judge Abraham Sofaer in Sharon v. Time, Inc.' This case involved
Time's assertion that then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had en-
couraged a Phalangist massacre of Palestinian refugees.10 7 At the conclu-
sion of the trial, the jury was first asked whether Time had defamed Sharon.
Having concluded "yes,"'0 8 the jury was then instructed to determine
whether Time's statements about Sharon were false. After another affirma-
tive finding, 0 9 the jury was asked to determine whether Time had made the
statements with known falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity-
"actual malice.""'  On this question, the jury reached a negative conclu-
sion."' Both plaintiff and defendant emerged from the courtroom pro-
claiming victory: Sharon because his reputation had been vindicated; Time
because it had been neither found at fault nor required to pay money
damages."
2
The tripartite special verdict employed by Judge Sofaer strikes a rea-
sonable, constitutionally sound balance between the plaintiff's interest in
his reputation and the defendant's First Amendment rights." 3 Furthermore,
105. The plaintiff's need to clear her name is not diminished by the fact that the defendant
made the defamatory publication in good faith.
106. 609 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
107. Id. at 1292.
108. Arnold H. Lubasch, Jury Decides Time Defamed Sharon in Massacre Article, N.Y.
Terms, Jan. 17, 1985, at B7.
109. Arnold H. Lubasch, Jurors Back Sharon on 2d Key Point in Libel Trial, N.Y. TiMES, Jan.
19, 1985, at Al.
110. It was undisputed that Sharon was a public official/figure subject to the Sullivan standard.
Sharon, 609 F. Supp. at 1295.
111. Arnold H. Lubasch, Time Cleared of Libeling Sharon But Jurors Criticize Its Reporting,
N.Y. Trams, Jan. 25, 1985, at Al.
112. Honesty requires me to add a coda to this otherwise heartwarming account of judicial
ingenuity. Some time after the trial, Time's counsel expressed dismay at the fact that each seg-
ment of the jury's tripartite verdict had been reported in the press (e.g., supra notes 108-11), an
interesting view for a person defending the right to publish unflattering accounts of the activities
of others. Sharon, for his part, pursued another action for libel against Time in Israel, where
American constitutional requirements of actual malice do not apply. Sharon ultimately withdrew
the action in return for a public apology and a substantial contribution toward his legal costs. Ian
Murray, Time Will Apologize to Sharon, THE Trvas (London), Jan. 23, 1986, at 12. Still, the fact
that another nation's laws provided additional opportunities for Mr. Sharon does not mean that
justice was not served by American law as applied in Judge Sofaer's courtroom.
113. The tripartite verdict should pass constitutional muster for the same reasons as the pro-
posed Act's vindication remedy: Sullivan and Gertz speak only of First Amendment limitations
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it channels the jury into legally correct determinations guided by the facts
and law, rather than passion or sympathy.' 14 The tripartite verdict might
thereby restrain juries from making legally incorrect awards, particularly if
they are aware that the plaintiff may receive vindication in the form of
declaratory relief. In addition, an explicit jury determination as to each ele-
ment discourages plaintiffs who have been accurately defamed from abus-
ing the process.1
5
Although a trial judge could order a tripartite verdict in the absence of
an express statutory mandate, the greatest advantage to this procedure
would be obtained through its incorporation into statute or rule of court. A
plaintiff who has been truthfully defamed, and who nevertheless hopes to
"win by suing," is dissuaded from doing so only if she knows in advance
that the tripartite verdict will be employed. A plaintiff who proceeds in
good faith, on the other hand, should be able to proceed with an action for
damages before she knows whether or not fault can be demonstrated. The
on actions for damages; the need to protect First Amendment rights declines as the penalties
exacted are reduced. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. Former Justice White has sug-
gested use of the tripartite verdict; to date, the rest of the Court has been unresponsive. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,768 n.2 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
Interestingly, Justice White's successor, prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court, also had
occasion to praise Judge Sofaer's ingenuity. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 809 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
However, at least one commentator has seen constitutional problems in allowing a plaintiff
who has not proved actual malice to obtain a modicum of relief through the special verdict. See
Syndi L. Norris, Comment, Winning the War Against Self-Censorship: Eliminating Special Ver-
dicts in Defamation Actions, 90 DICK. L. REv. 683, 694-704 (1986).
114. The same can be said of special verdicts in tort actions generally. Greater use of the
special verdict might obviate the need for more radical means of jury control, such as directed
verdicts, remittitur and statutory damage caps.
115. It is possible that the defamation action brought by General William P. Westmoreland
against CBS, tried in the same courthouse as the Sharon case, was settled in mid-trial and with no
exchange of money because General Westmoreland feared that the tripartite special verdict would
be employed in his trial, but with a different outcome, i.e., that the jury would find for the defend-
ant on the issue of falsity. In other words, the prospect of the tripartite verdict may have caused
Westmoreland to realize that he could not win by suing, and that any damage caused by CBS's
libel (regarding allegedly inaccurate North Vietnamese troop counts provided by Westmoreland to
President Johnson during the Vietnam War) might be compounded by a jury verdict. Subsequent
writings by U.S. District Judge Pierre N. Leval, who presided over the Westmoreland trial, tend to
buttress the suspicion that Judge Leval would have borrowed a page from Judge Sofaer's book.
See Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place,
101 HARv. L. REv. 1287, 1291-98 (1988).
In fairness to General Westmoreland, Anthony Lewis has written:
The "truth" as to the number of North Vietnamese troops infiltrating into the South
before the Tet offensive in 1968 was not a provable truth. The case turned on whether
certain local guerilla forces should be included in the estimated numbers of soldiers that
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were facing. This depended on what kind of war it
was, which was subject to much political debate and not capable of a settled answer in
law.
Lnvis, supra note 45, at 216.
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failure to prove fault should deprive her of damages and will often entitle
the defendant to partial summary judgment; it should not deprive the plain-
tiff of vindication. Vindication should depend solely on the facts, not on
the election of the cleverest legal strategem. Thus, the tripartite verdict ful-
fills the same goals as the proposed Act's vindication remedy but in a more
straightforward, comprehensive way. Future proposals providing for vindi-
cation through the courts should therefore incorporate the tripartite verdict
rather than a separate vindication remedy.
IV. TURNING LEMONS INTO LEMONADE: THE UNIFORM CORRECTION OR
CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION Acr
Facing substantial opposition to the proposed Act, the Drafting Com-
mittee, in late spring of 1993, mercifully withdrew most of the proposed
Defamation Act and substituted the Uniform Correction or Clarification of
Defamation Act ("Correction Act"). The Correction Act is drawn largely
from Article IV of the proposed Act. Recognizing that a massive revision
of the substantive law of libel and slander was beyond reach, the Committee
produced an act designed to change the manner in which parties would go
about trying and, more significantly, settling defamation cases. The result-
ing Correction Act "seeks to remedy.., flaws in current law by providing
strong incentives for the parties in a defamation suit promptly to correct or
clarify the alleged defamation as an alternative to costly litigation."'1 6 The
Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws at its annual meeting on August 5, 1993.117
A. Substantive Provisions
1. Definitions
The Correction Act is shorter and less ambitious than the proposed Act
from which it sprung. For example, the definitions section, section 1, de-
fines just three terms: "defamatory,"' 118 "person,"119 and "economic loss."
Because timely and sufficient corrections under the Act limit the plaintiff's
remedy to economic loss, the meaning of the last term is of great impor-
116. UNW. CORR. OR CLAn. Act, supra note 7, Prefatory Note.
117. A motion at the annual meeting of the Commissioners to adopt the proposed Defamation
Act was "soundly defeated." News Notes, 21 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA), Aug. 24, 1993 (quoting
Henry Kaufrnan, General Counsel, Libel Defense Resource Center).
The American Bar Association will consider the Correction Act at its February, 1994 mid-
winter meeting. State legislative consideration of the Act is likely to follow thereafter.
118. "'Defamatory' means tending to harm reputation." UNw. CORR. OR CLARw. AcT, supra
note 7, § 1(1).
119. "'Person' means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, asso-
ciation, joint venture, or other legal or commercial entity, but does not include a government or
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality." Id. § 1(3).
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tance. Section 1(3) defines economic loss as "special, pecuniary loss
caused by the publication." 120
2. Scope
Section 2 of the Correction Act, the scope section, indicates that the
Act "applies to any [claim for relief], however characterized, for damages
arising out of harm to personal reputation caused by the false content of a
publication that is published on or after the effective date" of the Correction
Act.121 Rather than merging libel and slander into a single action for defa-
mation, as it had done under the Defamation Act, the Drafting Committee
was content to promulgate a scope provision broad enough to encompass
both of the traditional actions. 12 2 Sections 11 through 14 of the Act are
boilerplate provisions involving "Uniformity of Application and Construc-
tion,"'123 the "Short" Title,'24 "Severability,"' and the "Effective Date.'
26
3. Request for Correction or Clarification
The heart of the Correction Act is found in sections 3 through 10.127
Section 3 provides in part, "A person may maintain an action for defama-
120. Id. § 1(3). It is clear from the context of the Act that economic loss does not include
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. Section 8 of the Correction Act (which deals with
offers to correct or clarify when a timely correction or clarification is no longer possible) lists
"reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees" as an item of recovery separate from
economic loss, thereby distinguishing the two. Idr § 8.
121. Id § 2(a). The Correction Act "applies to all publications, including writings, broad-
casts, oral communications, electronic transmissions, or other forms of transmitting information."
Id. § 2(b). This is an act for the information age.
122. Interestingly, § 3 of the Correction Act speaks in terms of an "action for defamation." Id.
§ 3(a). By moving the scope provision to the front of the Act (it had previously been buried in
§ 10) and placing it between the definition of "defamatory" in § 1 and the term "action for defa-
mation" in § 3, the drafters appear to have indicated that such an action embraces all claims within
the scope provision. An explicit defimition of an "action for defamation" might have closed the
circle, but the Drafting Committee was reluctant to tangle with the underlying law. Once burned,
twice shy.
The Act is intended to embrace all actions for reputational injury, however styled. See id. § 2
cmt. It therefore covers actions for invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress insofar
(but only insofar) as they involve reputational harm. Id. §§ 1-2 cmts. While "corporate" defama-
tion claims are covered (because a corporation is a "person" under the Act, see supra note 119),
claims such as product disparagement, unfair competition, false advertising and the like are not
covered under the Act, as they "do not rest on harm to a person's reputation or other parasitic
emotional harm." See Uam. CORR. OR CIA~ni. Acr, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. This may prove to be
too fine a line to maintain.
123. UNIF. CORR. OR CLARtF. ACr, supra note 7, § 11.
124. Id § 12.
125. Id § 13.
126. Id § 14.
127. These were §§ 2 through 9 before the Style Committee moved the scope section to the
beginning of the Act.
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tion only if: (1) the person has made a timely and adequate request for
correction or clarification from the defendant; or (2) the defendant has
otherwise made a correction or clarification." 12 8 Service of a summons and
complaint for defamation containing the requisite information constitutes an
adequate request for correction or clarification.' 29 Thus, a request for re-
traction is not, in the technical sense, a condition precedent to an action, as
in some existing retraction statutes. 130 The Act thereby "attempts to avoid
technical requirements that can often serve as traps for unwary
plaintiffs.'
13'
"A request for correction or clarification is timely [under the Act] if it
is made within the period of limitation for defamation actions."' 132 How-
ever, if the plaintiff fails to make a good faith attempt to request correction
or clarification within ninety days after knowledge of the publication, dam-
ages are limited to provable economic loss. 1 33 Thus, as a practical matter, a
plaintiff must request correction or clarification within the ninety day win-
dow or lose out on a substantial portion of her potential damages (i.e., gen-
eral damages for pain, suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of
reputation). 1
34
Under section 3(c) of the Act, a request for correction or clarification
is adequate if it:
(1) is made in writing and reasonably identifies the person
making the request;
(2) specifies with particularity the statement alleged to be
false and defamatory and, to the extent known, the time and place
of publication;
(3) states the alleged defamatory meaning of the statement;
128. UNW. CORR. OR CLARiF. AcT, supra note 7, § 3(a). Throughout the Act, the term "cor-
rection or clarification" is used, rather than the more familiar term "retraction." The new terms
are probably more descriptive and perhaps carry less stigma for defendants than "retraction." One
has visions of the city editor proclaiming, "We refuse to retract, but we're happy to correct or
clarify." No harm in saving face, so long as the record is set straight. Call that a win/win
solution.
129. Id. § 3(d).
130. See Current Retraction Practice-An LDRC Survey, LDRC BULLETN (Libel Defense
Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), 1992-93, Issue No. 3 at 2-3 [hereinafter Current Retraction
Practice] (indicating that several states require that the plaintiff demand a retraction before suit is
brought). This publication provides the results of a comprehensive fifty-state survey on current
retraction statutes and practice.
131. UNia. CORR. OR CLARm. Acr, supra note 7, § 3 cmt.
132. Id. § 3(b).
133. Id.
134. The limitations period for commencement of a defamation action is tolled while the
plaintiff waits for a response to a request for clarification. Id. § 3(e).
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(4) specifies the circumstances giving rise to any defama-
tory meaning of the statement which arises from other than the
express language of the publication; and
(5) states that the alleged defamatory meaning of the state-
ment is false.
135
Thus, while some litigation over the adequacy of requests is inevitable, the
Correction Act spells out its requirements sufficiently to avoid vague, shot-
gun requests that fail to pinpoint what is at issue.136
Of course, a publisher may not always have enough information to
immediately accede to a request for correction or clarification. 137 Section 4
of the Act therefore provides that a publisher may ask that a person request-
ing a correction or clarification disclose "reasonably available information
material to the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement."1 38 Unreason-
able failure to provide this information limits the plaintiff to recovery of
provable economic lOSS.'
39
4. Effect of Correction or Clarification
Of critical importance is section 5 of the Act. This provision states, "If
a timely and sufficient correction or clarification is made, a person may
recover only provable economic loss, as mitigated by the correction or clar-
ification.""' A publisher may therefore significantly limit its exposure to
damages by making an adequate correction or clarification. Given the po-
tential for huge awards of general and punitive damages, many publishers
are likely to take advantage of this provision. With the publisher having
done so, the defamed party is likely to abandon any claim for libel or slan-
der because she will have obtained a measure of vindication through the
correction or clarification, and in most instances, an action limited to prova-
ble economic loss will not be worth the cost.'
4 '
At a minimum, the incentives and disincentives built into this section
will reduce the stakes involved in many defamation actions; at best, these
135. Id. § 3(c).
136. The comments to § 3 indicate that the "good faith attempt' necessary to preserve a claim
for economic loss does not require the requesting party to satisfy all of the specific requirements
of § 3(c) within the 90 day period. 'It is sufficient that an attempt to obtain a correction or
clarification was made and that the publisher was given sufficient notice of that fact." Id. § 3 cmt.
137. As the comments indicate, "the person challenging a publication's truth will often be in
possession of the information upon which its falsity can be judged." Id. § 4 cmt. As suggested
earlier, it is often the plaintiff who is in the best position to demonstrate whether the defamatory
statement is true or false. See supra note 102.
138. UNIF. CORR. OR CLAw. Acr, supra note 7, § 4(a).
139. Id. § 4(b).
140. Id. § 5.
141. In some instances, a modest financial settlement that helps defray the plaintiff's litigation
expenses or provides compensation for economic loss may encourage her to abandon the claim.
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measures should promote early resolution of such disputes. Much grief and
embarrassment to the defamed party may be avoided at little expense or
trouble to the publisher through the simple measure of a correction or clari-
fication, which can prevent a molehill of misunderstanding from turning
into a mountain of litigation. 42 While the avenue of retraction was always
open to publishers, 43 the significant reduction in damages now resulting
therefrom should cause publishers to give that course of action more serious
consideration.
5. Timeliness and Sufficiency
Our next inquiry involves what constitutes a "timely and sufficient
correction or clarification" so as to limit damages in accordance with sec-
tion 5. That issue is addressed in section 6 of the Correction Act, which
provides that "[a] correction or clarification is timely if it is published
before, or within 45 days after, receipt of a request for correction or clarifi-
cation."'" A correction or clarification is sufficient if it:
(1) is published with a prominence and in a manner and me-
dium reasonably likely to reach substantially the same audience
as the publication complained of;
(2) refers to the statement being corrected or clarified and:
(i) corrects the statement;
(ii) in the case of defamatory meaning arising from
other than the express language of the publication, disclaims an
intent to communicate that meaning or to assert its truth; or
(iii) in the case of a statement attributed to another per-
son, identifies the person and disclaims an intent to assert the
truth of the statement; and
142. The Correction Act's incentives for settlement bring to mind an October, 1981 report in
The Washington Post's "Ear" column. That report discussed a "rumor" that former President
Jimmy Carter had bugged President-Elect and Mrs. Reagan while they were residing in Blair
House prior to the inauguration. The Ear, WASH. PosT, October 5, 1981, at Dl, col. 1. After
some posturing, the Post published a retraction and apology that extolled the former President's
record in matters pertaining to the right of privacy and stated, in part, "We now believe the story
... to have been wrong." Paul Taylor, Post Apologizes to Carter for Gossip Column Item, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 23, 1981 at Al, col. 5. As a consequence, Carter decided not to sue the Post for libel.
The dispute was resolved in eighteen days. Widespread enactment of the Correction Act may
encourage early resolution of more disputes in this manner.
143. Most existing retraction statutes eliminate punitive damages in the event of a retraction,
but retain general damages. See Current Retraction Practice, supra note 130, at 7. The threat of
crippling awards therefore remains. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
144. Urn'. CORR. OR CIARiw. Act, supra note 7, § 6(a). Where a request for disclosure of
evidence of falsity is made under § 4, a correction or clarification is timely if published within 25
days after receipt of a response or 45 days after receipt of the request for correction or clarifica-
tion, whichever is later. Id. § 4(c).
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(3) is communicated to the person who has made a request for
correction or clarification. 145
Section 6 further explains that "[a] correction or clarification is pub-
fished in a medium reasonably likely to reach substantially the same audi-
ence as the publication complained of if it is published in a later issue,
edition, or broadcast of the original publication."'" The section also speci-
fies alternatives that may be employed when a subsequent issue, edition or
broadcast will not be published within the necessary time limits.1 4 7
Although litigation over these matters is inevitable, the Drafting Committee
took pains to spell out what qualifies as a correction or clarification suffi-
cient to invoke the Correction Act's damage limitations. The language is
broad enough to encompass not only publications by mass media but also
private, less formal publications in the form of letters, telephone conversa-
tions and the like.'48
Treatment of defamatory statements attributable to others under sec-
tion 6(b)(2)(iii) is worthy of special comment. This provision in effect es-
tablishes a privilege of neutral reportage, 49 to be asserted in the form of a
clarification. A simpler course of action would have been to establish a
neutral reportage privilege to be asserted as a defense, without need for a
"non-retraction retraction" in the form of a clarification. 5 ° Such a privilege
would allow a publisher to repeat another person's defamatory statement
without liability, so long as there was proper attribution.15 ' Many readers
145. lId § 6(b).
146. Id. § 6(c). The comments indicate that the principal thrust of the "sufficiency" require-
ment is that the correction or clarification reach "substantially the same audience" as the chal-
lenged publication. This may require, at least in some instances, greater prominence than the
regularly published corrections column of a daily newspaper, depending upon the prominence of
the original defamatory story. IL § 6(c) cmt.
147. Id. § 6(d).
148. The comments to this section suggest a few examples of such publications. Among them
is the defamatory employee reference or evaluation. In this situation, correction "may require no
more than contacting those persons or firms to whom the defamatory statement was communi-
cated." Id. § 6 cmt. However, if the statement has made its way to broader audiences, further
steps should be taken, including efforts to have the offending material removed from files. Id.
Another example is the oral defamation to friends or colleagues (describe in the comments as
"a classic slander"). Here, "a letter to those persons correcting or clarifying the defamation might
suffice, on the assumption that word of the correction or clarification would spread as rapidly in
the channels of gossip as did the original defamation." Id.
149. Courts have found that a privilege of neutral reportage allows for accurate reports of
newsworthy statements of others. See, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d
113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977).
150. The term "non-retraction retraction" is reminiscent of the "non-denial denials" issued
during the Watergate scandal and described by Washington Post reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob
Woodward. See CARL BmNs= & BoB WooDwAi, ALL Tam PRtSmErr's MEN 92, 104, 144
(1974).
151. The requirement of proper attribution prevents a publisher from hiding behind a phantom
source. It also provides the defamed party with a form of discovery by smoking out the source,
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will ignore the attribution, however, such that a defamed party should there-
fore have the benefit of a subsequent clarification. As Dean Bezanson has
written, "Harm can accrue from even the most carefully worded neutral
report, as reasonable readers do attach significance to an attributed remark
simply by virtue of the fact that the publisher has deemed it worthy of
publication."' 52
6. Procedural Consequences
Section 7 of the Act describes the procedural consequences of a cor-
rection or clarification, providing, in pertinent part:
If a defendant... intends to rely on a timely and sufficient
correction or clarification, the defendant's intention to do so, and
the correction or clarification relied upon, must be set forth in a
notice served on the plaintiff within 60 days after service of the
[summons and complaint] or 10 days after the correction or clari-
fication is made, whichever is later. A correction or clarification
is deemed to be timely and sufficient unless the plaintiff chal-
lenges its timeliness or sufficiency within [20 days] after the mo-
tion is served.'
53
Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of challenging the adequacy of a
correction or clarification; absent such challenge, the plaintiff is limited to
provable economic loss. If a challenge is mounted, the timeliness and suffi-
ciency of correction or clarification are determined by the court well before
trial.' 54  Plaintiffs' counsel should read the Act carefully; a cavalier ap-
proach to litigation may severely disadvantage many plaintiffs and their
contingent fee-dependent counsel.
who remains a potential defamation defendant unable to invoke the protection of the Correction
Act unless she, too, publishes a timely and sufficient retraction. See UNF. CORR. OR ClAaRIu. ACT,
supra note 7, § 9.
As the comment points out, nothing in the Act requires disclosure of confidential sources.
Rather,
If there is a confidential source, the media defendant would have three alternative
courses of action: (1) limit its liability by issuing a correction under this section and
identifying its source, (2) issue a correction under subsection (b)(2)(i) or (ii) without
identifying the source but fully vindicating the plaintiff's reputation, or (3) defend the
defamation action.
Id. § 6 cnt.
152. Letter from Randall P. Bezanson, Dean and Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Uni-
versity School of Law to author (January 5, 1993) (on file with author).
153. UNIr. CORR. OR C.A iu. Acr, supra note 7, § 7(a). The bracketed material allows for
minor variations consistent with local practice. See id. § 7 cmt.
A defendant's challenge to the adequacy or timeliness of a request for correction or clarifica-
tion must be set forth no later than 60 days after service of the summons and complaint. Id. § 7
cmt.(b). Plaintiffs might question the asymmetry.
154. Id. § 7 cmt. This section prevents plaintiffs from proceeding to trial on the false hope
that a challenge will succeed at the last minute and unlock the defendant's coffers.
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7. Evidentiary Issues
Should the parties proceed to trial, the Act renders inadmissible (a) the
fact or contents of a request for correction or clarification, or its acceptance
or refusal, (b) the fact or contents of a correction or clarification, except in
mitigation of damages, and (c) the fact or contents of an offer of correction
or clarification, or its refusal. 5 ' These limitations on admissibility may, at
first glance, appear puzzling. Why should an act that seeks to reduce the
complexity and expense of defamation actions not allow a correction or
clarification to serve as an admission as to the falsity of the original defam-
atory statement, thereby reducing the issues for trial? Why allow the parties
to litigate the falsity of a statement that has already been corrected by its
publisher?
I believe that the answers to these questions lie in the Committee's
determination to structure the Act to promote the making of corrections and
clarifications. With corrections and clarifications inadmissible except to
mitigate damages, publishers contemplating a correction or clarification
need not worry that such a course of action will redound to their disadvan-
tage at trial. The provisions of section 10 thus play a role analogous to
Rules 407156 and 408157 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While the evi-
dentiary provisions may, in a few cases, produce inconsistent results, they
are more likely to encourage early termination of litigation.
8. Offer to Correct or Clarify
The remaining substantive provision of the Correction Act is section 8.
This provision contemplates a situation under which a timely correction or
clarification is no longer possible, but the publisher nevertheless wishes to
make a correction or clarification. Such a scenario may arise when, after
discovery, the publisher determines that a correction or clarification is war-
ranted. To invoke the protections of section 8, the publisher must make a
written offer to (i) publish a sufficient correction or clarification and (ii) pay
the defamed person's reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's
fees, incurred before publication of the correction or clarification. 5 8 Writ-
ten acceptance of an offer of this type bars or, if an action has been com-
155. Id. § 10. The section also provides, "If the fact that a correction or clarification was
made or the contents of the correction or clarification are received in evidence, the fact of the
request may also be received." Ia § 10(b).
Offers of correction or clarification are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 158-62.
156. Under Far. R. Evm. 407, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible to
prove negligence or other culpable conduct.
157. Under FED. R. EvD. 408, evidence of compromise or offers of compromise is inadmissi-
ble to prove liability for the claim for which compromise is offered.
158. UN n. CoRR. OR CLA~iu. Acr, supra note 7, § 8(a).
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menced, terminates an action for defamation against the publisher.159 A
person refusing to accept a correction or clarification offered under section
8 may recover only provable economic loss and reasonable expenses of
litigation, including attorney's fees incurred before the offer.16
As in the provisions for timely correction or clarification, section 8 of
the Act encourages damage control. Because the action has moved forward
or, at minimum, the defamatory statement has had an opportunity to fester,
a proper offer to correct or clarify must at this stage include an offer to pay
litigation expenses. Likewise, the plaintiff who proceeds in the face of a
proffered correction or clarification is entitled to an award of litigation ex-
penses in addition to damages for economic loss.161 Should the expecta-
tions of the Drafting Committee be fulfilled, the plaintiff in this situation
will likely settle for a correction or clarification and payment of litigation
expenses, thereby preventing or terminating the litigation. 62
The Correction Act thus provides not just one, but two opportunities
for the defendant to limit damages by means of a correction or clarification:
through timely correction or clarification as provided by sections 5 and 6, or
through a subsequent offer to correct or clarify as allowed by section 8. As
a mediator who has often seen prospects for settlement ripen over time, I
believe that section 8 of the Act represents a wise piece of drafting. It is
consistent with the main goal of the Correction Act: to provide the parties
ample incentive and opportunity to settle without protracted litigation.
B. Constitutional Considerations
The Correction Act should pose few problems under the United States
Constitution. Unlike the provisions regarding attorney's fees under the pro-
posed Defamation Act, the provision for court-ordered attorney's fees under
section 8(c)(2) of the Correction Act is not constitutionally problematic. 163
159. Id. § 8(b). If an action has been commenced, dismissal is not proper until the defendant
has complied with the terms of the offer. Id.
160. l § 8(c). Expenses of litigation are unavailable to a plaintiff who has failed to make a
good faith effort to request a correction or clarification pursuant to § 3(b) or failed to disclose
information pursuant to § 4 of the Act. Id.
161. Again there is provision for a judicial determination of the sufficiency of the retraction.
Id. § 8(d). The same subsection provides for a judicial determination as to the amount of reason-
able expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees. Id.
162. It may appear unfair to allow a defendant who has failed to make a timely correction or
clarification to terminate litigation by offering a belated correction or clarification, together with
litigation expenses. A defendant who had corrected or clarified on a timely basis could eliminate
damages for all but economic loss, but could not terminate the litigation. The saving grace is that
the belated correction or clarification requires acceptance by the plaintiff; absent such acceptance
the action may continue, with the plaintiff recovering litigation expenses as well as economic loss.
On balance, this seems fair to all parties.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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The proposed Defamation Act required only the plaintiff's unilateral elec-
tion of the vindication remedy to trigger an award of attorney's fees. The
Correction Act requires action by the defendant, such as an untimely offer
to correct or clarify, and a response by the plaintiff, such as rejection of the
offer, before attorney's fees can be awarded. 161
Because the defendant can, under the Correction Act, unilaterally fore-
close the plaintiff's recovery of certain categories of damages, constitu-
tional challenges to the Act are most likely to be mounted by plaintiffs.
"Open courts" provisions of state constitutions, which guarantee citizens
access to the courts to pursue actions recognized at common law, are the
most likely bases for constitutional challenge. 165 Retraction statutes en-
acted by individual states have generally passed constitutional muster when
their effect has been merely to eliminate punitive damages in libel or slan-
der actions.' 66 The courts recognize that plaintiffs have no vested right to
punitive damages and that the awarding of punitive damages is, therefore, a
matter of legislative discretion.
67
In several cases, however, retraction statutes, or portions thereof, have
been declared unconstitutional where the effect of a retraction or the failure
to demand one was to limit recoverable damages to pecuniary loss. 16 8 Typ-
ical of these cases is Madison v. Yunker.169 In Madison, the Montana
Supreme Court construed a retraction statute in light of a state constitutional
"open courts" provision which provided, in pertinent part, that "[c]ourts of
justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every
injury of person, property, or character."' 0 The court determined that the
denial of general damages to a plaintiff who had failed to demand a retrac-
tion pursuant to Montana's retraction statute' 7 ' deprived the plaintiff of a
164. Recovery of attorney's fees, as well as damages for provable economic loss under §§ 5
and 8(c), are subject to the constitutional limitations set forth in cases such as Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1985), Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This constitutional doctrine, together with the underlying com-
mon law, remain premises upon which the Act is based. Unlike the proposed Defamation Act, the
Correction Act aims not to modify constitutional doctrine but to provide incentives for settlement.
Circumstances remain very much under the parties' control, or perhaps more accurately, the de-
fendant's control.
165. For an example of an "open courts" provision, see infra text accompanying note 170.
166. E.g., Comer v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 44 So. 673, 674-75 (Ala. 1907); Bank of
Oregon v. Independent News, Inc., 693 P.2d 35, 39-40 (Or. 1985).
167. See, e.g., Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412,414 (Fla. 1950) (en banc); Kelly v. Hall, 12 S.E.2d
881, 883 (Ga. 1941); Osborn v. Leach, 47 S.E. 811, 813 (N.C. 1904).
168. These cases are of obvious relevance to our consideration of the Correction Act, which
limits damages in a similar manner.
169. 589 P.2d 126 (Mont. 1978).
170. MONT. CoNsT. art II, § 7.
171. MONT. CODE ANN. § 64-207.1 (1947).
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remedy guaranteed under the state constitution. Significantly, the court
found that the "right" of a libeled individual to obtain a retraction under the
statute was not in itself a remedy.
172
In a similar case, Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 73 the defend-
ant newspaper published a timely retraction of a story erroneously reporting
that the plaintiffs, two security guards, had pled guilty to burglary
charges. 7 4 In accordance with Arizona's retraction statute,1
75 the trial
judge's jury instructions precluded an award of general damages for loss of
reputation and emotional distress. 176 The jury returned a verdict favoring
the defense.'77 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the re-
traction statute violated Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution,
which provides, "The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation."' 78 The court read the constitutional provision broadly
enough to extend to actions for strict liability as well as negligence, and to
extend to actions for defamation as well as for bodily injury.1 79 In addition,
the court found that the statute did not merely regulate recovery for defama-
tion, but abrogated it in violation of the state constitution.'80 The court
stated:
[The retraction statutes go beyond regulating the mode,
method, and procedure to be followed in pursuing the cause of
action. In addition, the retraction statutes do not merely regulate
the type and amount of damage that can be recovered. Instead,
they completely deprive many who have sustained real injury of
judicial remedy. For many who have been wronged, the effect of
the statutes is to substitute retraction-a form of correction, with-
drawal, and sometimes of apology-for a judicial remedy. A re-
traction is insufficient .... The legislature is without power to
eliminate a judicial remedy. Of course, nothing prevents the leg-
islature from requiring that retraction be considered in mitigation
of damages, a principle already recognized at common law.181
172. Madison, 589 P.2d at 131.
173. 730 P.2d 186 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
174. Id. at 187.
175. Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.02 to 12-653.03 (1992).
176. Boswell, 730 P.2d at 187.
177. Id. at 188.
178. Id. at 188, 196. For a detailed legislative history of this constitutional provision, see, e.g.,
Roger C. Henderson, Tort Reform, Separation of Powers, and The Arizona Constitutional Con-
vention of 1910, 35 A~iz. L. REv. 535 passim (1993).
179. Boswell, 730 P.2d at 194.
180. Id. at 196.
181. Id.
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Thus, using strong language, Arizona's highest court ruled in a manner con-
sistent with earlier decisions in North Carolina,'82 Kansas, 183 and North
Dakota.' 84 While some of these cases may be regarded as antiquated, at
least one such case has been cited with approval in a more recent case in
which another statutory tort reform was declared unconstitutional.1
8 5
Retraction statutes are not without their constitutional defenders, how-
ever. In California, a state without an "open courts" provision, a retraction
statute protecting only media defendants has been upheld against equal pro-
tection and due process challenges.' 86 More importantly, retraction statutes
limiting recovery to special damages have been upheld in the face of "open
court" challenges in Oregon18 7 and Minnesota. 88 The discussion of the
Oregon Supreme Court in one such case is instructive. Writing for the
court, Justice Holman stated,
The language of the constitution 89 does not specify that the
remedy need be the same as was available at common law at the
time of the adoption of the constitution; and the statute, while
restricting the remedy, does not abolish the cause of action....
In addition, the legislature has made available a retraction as
a substitute for the remedy which the law would otherwise have
provided.... As a practical matter, retraction can come nearer to
182. Osborn v. Leach, 47 S.E. 811, 812 (N.C. 1904). The North Carolina Supreme Court
construed a retraction statute limiting recovery to "actual damages" as allowing recovery of both
special and general damages, but not punitive damages, so as to survive constitutional challenge.
Id. at 813; accord, Pentuff v. Park, 138 S.E. 616, 619 (N.C. 1927) (recognizing the Osborn deci-
sion as establishing the constitutionality of the retraction statute).
183. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 75 P. 1041, 1042-44 (Kan. 1904) (striking down statute limiting
recovery to "actual" damages in the event of retraction).
184. Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 178 N.W. 792, 794 (N.D. 1920). In Meyerle, the
North Dakota Supreme Court construed a statute similar to that struck down in Hanson so as to
allow recovery of only those damages "sufficient to compensate.., for the injury remaining
unsatisfied after the publication of the retraction." Id. at 795-96. This eliminated exemplary dam-
ages, but allowed general and special damages to the extent unmitigated by the retraction. The
statute's constitutionality was thereby preserved as in Osborn.
185. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260-61 (Kan. 1988) (citing
Hanson as authority for striking down damage cap in medical malpractice actions).
186. Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825, 828-35 (Cal. 1950) (en
banc), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 910 (1951).
187. Davidson v. Rogers, 574 P.2d 624 (Or. 1978); Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 365
P.2d 845 (Or. 1961), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 370 U.S. 157 (1962).
188. Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 41 N.W. 936, 938-39 (Minn. 1889). Allen was cited as re-
cently as 1990 to uphold a Minnesota statute placing a cap on damages for loss of consortium.
Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 734 (Minn. 1990).
189. Article I, § 10 of the Oregon Constitution provides that "every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation." OR. CONST. art I,
§ 10.
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restoring an injured reputation than can money, although neither
can completely restore it.190
Justice Linde, concurring, took a slightly different approach to
retraction:
A step taken by a putative defendant which the law does not
compel but leaves entirely to his own balance between his sense
of innocence or stubbornness on the one hand and his sense of
obligation or calculation of risk on the other is not a "remedy by
due course of law." If an optional retraction plays a role at all in
the validity of limiting the measure of damages for defamation, it
would have to be that the retraction is deemed to reduce the "in-
jury," not that it is a substitute legal remedy. 191
While the distinction made by Justice Linde is minute, I believe that
his view is the better one. A retraction or, under the language of the Cor-
rection Act, a correction or clarification, provided by a publisher does not
provide a substitute remedy, at least in the legal sense of the word, so much
as it reduces the injury giving rise to the cause of action and consequent
need for damages. A statute limiting damages or, more precisely, eliminat-
ing those damages least susceptible to objective calculation, represents a
reasonable effort to tailor the remedy to the wrong inflicted. Such a statute
should be upheld in the face of "open courts" provisions, particularly in
light of the equally strong constitutional protections regarding speech.
192
The recent tendency of the courts to uphold various types of tort reform
despite open courts provisions in state constitutions provides further support
for this view.'9 3
190. Davidson, 574 P.2d at 625.
191. Id. at 626. Justice Linde also noted that the statute did not withdraw the common law
action for defamation. Id. Perhaps more importantly, he felt it unnecessary to pursue the question
of "how far the legislature must retain money damages as a constitutionally required remedy for
noneconomic injuries," in light of the constitutional protection provided for speech. Id. To Jus-
tice Linde, that made defamation a "special case." Id.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 202-21.
193. Cases upholding statutory damage caps in medical malpractice actions are illustrative.
See, e.g., University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla.) (upholding statute offering
plaintiff choice between arbitration or cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
claims), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607
So. 2d 517, 521 (La.) (upholding cap on general damages in medical malpractice victim's suit
against multiple defendants), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2338 (1993); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d
102 (Md. 1992) (upholding cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions); Adams v.
Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Mo.) (en banc) (upholding cap on damages in
medical malpractice action), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 511 (1992). But see Smith v. Department of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 1987) (rejecting statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
absence of substitute remedy); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690-92 (Tex. 1988) (re-
jecting statutory damage limitations as violative of the Texas Constitution's "open courts"
provision).
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Open courts provisions should be construed as due process protections
guaranteeing all persons access to the courts to pursue recognized causes of
action; they should not forever freeze the common law in its place, with all
rights and remedies intact as they existed at the time of the adoption of the
state constitution. To suggest, as the Arizona court did,'94 that the legisla-
ture is incapable of altering causes of action and remedies that exist at
common law is "judicial chauvinism ' 19 of the worst kind. Automobile
guest statutes, 196 workers compensation acts, 197 anti-heart balm statutes, 98
no-fault liability schemes' 99 and a host of other statutory tort reforms would
all come tumbling down in the face of this philosophy.
Notwithstanding my own views, open court provisions in state consti-
tutions pose a potential barrier to judicial acceptance of the Correction
Act. 0 For this and other reasons,20' the Correction Act, despite its
charms, cannot be regarded as the ultimate remedy for all that ails defama-
tion law. It behooves us to consider other measures. Before doing so, how-
194. See Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 730 P.2d 186, 190-96 (1986).
195. Credit California's Justice Clark for the term "judicial chauvinism." See Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. of California, 532 P.2d 1226, 1247 (Cal. 1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
I acknowledge that Arizona's constitutional language to the effect that "the amount recovered
shall not be subject to any statutory limitation," Apiz. CoNsT. art. 18, § 6, presents an almost
insurmountable barrier to an interpretation friendly to the Correction Act.
196. Guest statutes (limiting causes of action on the part of non-paying passengers in
automobiles) have been upheld against constitutional challenge in several instances. See, e.g.,
Beasley v. Bozeman, 315 So. 2d 570,571 (Ala. 1975); Richardson v. Hansen, 527 P.2d 536 (Colo.
1974) (en banc); Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763, 775 (Ind. 1976). But see Johnson v. Hassett,
217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974) (finding guest statute unconstitutional on several grounds).
197. Workers compensation statutes, eliminating tort actions against employers in favor of
no-fault administrative remedies, have been widely upheld. See, e.g., Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of
Colo., 774 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Rajala v. Doresky, 661 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Kan.
1983); Heavner v. Town of Lincolnton, 162 S.E. 909, 910 (N.C.), appeal dismissed, 287 U.S. 672
(1932). In some instances, constitutional amendments have been required in order to sustain
workers' compensation acts. See, e.g., ARxz. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 8 (amended 1925); Oano
CONST. art. II, § 35 (amended 1912); PA. CONST. art. ml, § 18 (amended 1915).
198. These statutes, eliminating causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal con-
versation, have been universally upheld. See, e.g., Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Wis.
1991) (upholding statute eliminating action for criminal conversation); see also O'Neil v. Schuck-
ardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986) (judicially abolishing action for alienation of affection).
199. Automobile no-fault statutes have been widely, if not universally, upheld. See, e.g.,
Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.2d 1291, 1314 (Kan. 1974); Shavers v. Kelley, 267 N.W.2d 72, 77
(Mich. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); Montgomery v. Daniels, 340 N.E.2d 444, 446
(N.Y. 1975). But see Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 1974) (invalidating
portions of no-fault statute on constitutional grounds).
200. A 1964 law review note reported "open court' or "certain remedy" provisions in the
constitutions of 37 states. Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a Certain Remedy, 49 IowA L. Rnv.
1202, 1202 (1964).
201. For other reasons why the Correction Act may not be a panacea, see infra notes 237-39
and accompanying text.
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ever, we should develop criteria for the reform of defamation law and
evaluate the Correction Act in accordance with those criteria.
V. REFORMING DEFAMATION LAW: SOME CRITERIA AND A PROPOSAL
A. Criteria
I suggest we focus on three criteria, two primary and one secondary, as
guiding principles for defamation law reform.
1. Protection of Speech
The first of these criteria is that the law of defamation should provide
sufficient protection of speech to foster the free, lively debate and comment
necessary in a democracy. At the very least, this means that the law of
defamation must comply with the requirements of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.2 "2 The Supreme Court has imposed thus far
the following constitutional requirements in defamation cases: (1) Neither
a public official nor a public figure may recover damages for a statement
regarding his or her official or public conduct without proving, with clear
and convincing clarity, that the statement was made with known falsity or
with reckless disregard for truth or falsity (actual malice).2 "3 (2) No dam-
ages may be recovered by a plaintiff in a defamation action without proof of
fault,2" and presumed or punitive damages may not be recovered in the
absence of actual malice,20" unless the defamatory statement is not a matter
of public concern.20 6 (3) In an action against a media defendant involving a
statement that is a matter of public concern, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was
false.20 7
This list is surprisingly short in light of the complexity of the law of
defamation. Most cases not included in the citations to this list have been
of relatively little impact, consisting largely of early pronouncements subse-
quently overturned,20 procedural refinements, 209 limitations on the applica-
202. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...
U.S. Co sT. amend. I.
203. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welhe, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
204. Gertz 418 U.S. at 347.
205. l at 349.
206. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985).
207. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-79 (1986).
208. E.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (extending the Sullivan
"knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard" to alleged defamatory falsehoods uttered about a private
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tion of our short list of principles,210 or refusals to expand these principles
or adopt additional constitutional constraints.2" The brevity of the list does
not imply that the Supreme Court should not find or impose212 additional
constitutional limitations on defamation actions.213 More to the point, in
crafting legislation aimed in part at the protection of speech, we need not
limit ourselves to the constraints imposed to date by the Supreme Court,
based on the relatively small number of situations upon which it has ruled.
By limiting protection of speech to those rules already fashioned by the
Supreme Court, we forego the greatest advantage of legislation over
court-made law: the ability to anticipate future controversies, rather than
just react to existing ones, and to fashion a comprehensive body of law that
takes a wide variety of situations into account.214 This is even more impor-
tant where, as here, the Supreme Court lacks the power to construct a com-
plete body of law. Because libel and slander remain state law actions, the
Supreme Court can only limit the reach of these actions in light of First
Amendment concerns; it cannot piece together a comprehensive system
from the ground up.
How, then, does the existing body of First Amendment case law fail to
provide needed protection for arguably defamatory speech? Media and
other interested bodies associated with the defense of defamation cases tell
us that it is the financial impact of defamation actions that has the most
harmful effect on speech, and that the chilling effect of potential defamation
"individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest"'), overruled by 424 U.S. 448
(1976).
209. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that "a court
ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times 'clear and
convincing' evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists");
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984) (holding
that when reviewing a determination of actual malice, judges must independently examine the
entire record and determine whether actual malice has been established with convincing clarity,
rather than apply the clearly erroneous standard of FEn. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
210. E.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132, 135-36 (1979) (refusing to recognize a
federal research grantee as a public figure and refusing to extend congressional immunity under
the Speech or Debate Clause to encompass "defamatory statements scattered far and wide by mall,
press, and the electronic media"); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976) (refusing
to recognize a socialite as a "public figure" for purposes of applying the Sullivan standard and also
refusing to extend the Sullivan privilege to all reports of judicial proceedings).
211. E.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (refusing to recognize a sepa-
rate constitutional privilege for opinion).
212. The choice of words here depends on one's philosophy of jurisprudence; as one who
leans toward legal realism, I'm inclined to use the word "impose."
213. For example, by applying the burden of proof, as set forth in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986), to cases involving non-media defendants, or by eliminat-
ing punitive damages altogether.
214. By anticipating future constitutional rulings (e.g., the extension of the Hepps rule to
non-media defendants), statutory reform can eliminate the appreciable financial burden imposed
by constitutional litigation.
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liability will not disappear without meaningful reform with respect to dam-
ages.2 15 According to the Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC), there is
"no apparent limit to the endemic excesses of mega-jury awards that have
already had a grave impact on all aspects of media libel litigation." '216 A
recent LDRC report indicates that the average jury award against media
defendants has skyrocketed from less than $1.5 million from 1980 to 1989
to more than $9 million during 1990 and 1991.217 Granted, these figures
might be skewed by a single verdict for $58 million during the latter pe-
riod,218 but even the median award jumped from $200,000 for 1980-89 to
$1.5 million for 1990_91.219 This phenomenon is a product of both punitive
and compensatory damages. As the LDRC report claims,
It is clear from the LDRC data that juries know how to pun-
ish the media even when their damages are labeled as "compensa-
tory." This aspect of the problem flows from the ill-defined
nature of the non-economic damages that are most often awarded
in libel cases for damage to "reputation" and for "emotional dis-
tress." Such elements are to the media in libel litigation what
"pain and suffering" awards are to doctors and medical providers
in malpractice actions. They are the excuse for juries to shift
wealth based on sympathy for the alleged travails of assertedly
injured plaintiffs. And in the field of libel such sympathy is not
even for arguably measurable physical pain, but rather for alleged
social or psychic harm-impact all the more difficult if not im-
possible objectively to measure.22°
Hyperbole aside, one thing is clear from the data: The magnitude of
damages awarded in present-day libel actions has a detrimental impact on
speech sufficient to produce a chilling effect even on those publishers who
have yet to bear the brunt of a substantial jury verdict.221 Meaningful defa-
215. The intense media opposition to the proposed Act's vindication remedy tends to under-
mine this view. This remedy would have involved relatively little financial exposure for defama-
tion defendants.
216. Henry R. Kaufman, Libel Defense Resource Center General Counsel, Statement accom-
panying LDRC Recap, supra note 10, in LDRC RmELEsE, Aug. 26, 1992, at 4.
217. LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at 4.
218. Fifty-eight million dollars was awarded in Feazell v. A.H. Belo Corp., No. 86-22271
(Tex. Dist. Ct. 1991). The case was settled after a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was denied but prior to appeal. LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at B1.
219. LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at 4.
220. Id. at 15. I have written elsewhere about the unfair and disruptive effect of general
damages in medical malpractice cases. See Robert M. Ackerman, Medical Malpractice: A Time
for More Talk and Less Rhetoric, 37 MEzcR L. REv. 725, 736-37 (1986). For a more general
critique of general damages, see JEFFREY O'CoNNmL, ENDING INsULT To INJURY 48-55 (1975).
221. Despite data indicating a relatively high degree of success for defendants on appeal, see
supra note 44, litigants remain burdened by the substantial attorney's fees necessitated by appeal.
Testimony of Sam D. Kennedy, supra note 103, at 8-9; see also supra note 45 (describing the
Immuno case, which reported an excess of one million dollars in legal expenses). The largest
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mation law reform is therefore unlikely to occur in the absence of signifi-
cant reform in the area of damage awards.
2. Protection of Reputation
My second criterion for defamation law reform is so plain as to be
tautological: the law of defamation should provide a meaningful remedy
for injury to reputation. Granted, one could argue for complete elimination
of libel and slander as causes of action in light of First Amendment consid-
erations and the availability of self-help, at least for public figures, through
the marketplace of ideas.222 Realistically, however, some kind of legal
remedy for reputational harm seems imperative.2 ' Reflecting this view,
the Supreme Court has stated:
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by
defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to
abandon this purpose, for.., the individual's right to the protec-
tion of his own good name "reflects no more than our basic con-
cept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The
protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself,
is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendment. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to
any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional
system."
2 24
One might distinguish between the First Amendment's negative cove-
nant against government interference with speech and what would appear to
be an affirmative obligation undertaken by the state to protect its citizens'
reputations against injury by other citizens.2" We may honestly debate
whether we can realistically expect government to fulfill such affirmative
obligations. Perhaps it is more realistic and invites less unwanted govern-
ment intrusion simply to ask that government abide by its negative cove-
nants.226 Nevertheless, some kind of remedy for reputational harm, like
verdict reported by the LDRC, totalling $58 million, produced a post-verdict settlement, as the
defendant compromised rather than risking all on appeal. LDRC Recap, supra note 10, at B1.
222. Today, that probably means an appearance on Larry King Live or Oprah.
223. This view is reinforced by the construction of "open courts" provisions of state constitu-
tions so as to guarantee the right to bring an action for defamation. See supra text accompanying
notes 168-85.
224. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
225. This obligation may be reinforced by "open courts" provisions in many state constitu-
tions. E.g., ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 13; ARK. CONsT. art. II, § 13; CoNN. CoNST. art. I, § 10; DE-L.
CONST. art. I, § 9 (1992 Supp.); PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
226. We might distinguish between negative covenants that impose on government an obliga-
tion not to interfere with the rights of its citizens (as can be found throughout the Bill of Rights)
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some kind of remedy for personal injuries of the physical sort, will exist for
the foreseeable future.
Our acknowledgement of the need for a remedy for injury to reputation
does not imply that the traditional remedies for defamation-money dam-
ages for pecuniary loss and general damage to reputation, as well as puni-
tive damages-are the most appropriate ones. In the typical personal injury
action, plaintiff's counsel laments to the jury that, in an ideal world, we
would restore the plaintiff to the same physical condition she enjoyed prior
to the defendant's tortious conduct, i.e., restore the plaintiff's life or good
health. The laws of science, unfortunately, often prevent us from doing so.
Hence, the only remedy available takes the form of money damages. The
laws of science do not prevent us, however, from taking action to restore a
defamed plaintiff's reputation. Here, a remedy superior to damages may in
fact be available in the form of concrete steps to restore the plaintiffs good
name. If, as Shakespeare had lago state, he "[w]ho steals my purse steals
trash,"227 then money damages are a poor substitute for a remedy more
purposefully tailored to restore the plaintiffs reputation to good health, or,
at least as close to good health as possible in a world of supermarket tab-
loids, late-night television, and political dirty tricks.
3. Efficiency
My third proposed criterion is that any reform measure must be effi-
cient; that is, it must fulfill the first two criteria at as little cost-in terms of
time, money, effort, and emotional strain on the parties-as possible. This
criterion is subordinate but complementary to the first two, in that neither
expense, nor delay, nor disturbance of peace of mind is conducive to the
protection of speech or the protection of reputation. To effect a genuine
remedy for reputational injury without imposing an undue burden on
speech, a reform proposal must promote summary judgment in "bad" cases,
principled settlement in "good" cases, and a minimum of appeals when
cases are tried.228
One attribute of such a system would be a minimum of guesswork
regarding the proper application of the law to a given dispute. Certainty
and affirmative covenants that impose upon government a duty to provide something for its citi-
zens (be it food, education, or a cause of action for defamation).
227. WniAM SHrEsPEaRE, OTHmuEo act 3, sc. 3. It is ironic that Chief Justice Rehnquist
should have chosen Iago's lament to underscore the importance of the interest in protecting one's
good name. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990). It would appear to
present the prototypical example of one who doth protest too much. Apparently even in Shake-
speare's time, there were those who attempted to "win" by calling public attention to the be-
smirching of their reputations, notwithstanding the accuracy of the defamation.
228. By "bad" cases, I mean cases that never should have been brought; by "good" cases, I
mean cases with substantial merit.
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and stability regarding the law would reduce the number of pre-trial mo-
tions and post-trial appeals. With the law clearly established (within the
limits of our constitutional and common law system), the parameters of
litigation would be clarified and the opportunities for principled settlement
negotiations enhanced." 9 Fewer non-meritorious cases would be filed, par-
ticularly by lawyers dependent upon a contingent fee. Pretrial litigation
would involve less gamesmanship and greater attention to the clarification
of factual issues. To the extent facts are exposed, the need for trial would
diminish, with the parties better able to fashion a mutual-help230 remedy in
accord with the facts.
An efficient remedy would also involve a maximum amount of jury
control, subject to the American practice of allowing juries to determine
factual issues. If we are serious about clarity in the law and predictability
of results, then the parties must have assurances that the ultimate outcome
will be governed by law, not jury caprice. Rules calculated to promote
special verdicts, objective standards for damages, and where appropriate,
summary judgment are devices that can be employed to meet this end.
B. Evaluating the Correction Act
In large measure, the Correction Act addresses the three criteria. It
allows defendants to limit their exposure to crushing damage awards, and
thereby has a benign effect on speech. It also provides for a measure of
reputational relief by encouraging correction or clarification of defamatory
statements, while retaining damages for economic loss (and for general
reputational injury in the absence of a correction or clarification). The Cor-
rection Act's provisions are tailored to produce relatively quick, inexpen-
sive resolution of defamation cases, and are thereby consistent with our
efficiency criterion.
The Correction Act, concededly, is not without its flaws. To publish-
ers, the ability to eliminate general and punitive damages or even terminate
litigation upon publication of a correction or clarification might pose too
great a temptation. This may be particularly true in those organizations in
which economic decisions made in the boardroom compromise editorial de-
229. This is particularly true if law reform shifts the focus of defamation actions away from
issues of fault and back to the issue of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement. See
Anderson, supra note 11, at 521-22, and BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 184-90, for a discus-
sion of the gamesmanship created by the shift away from the core issue of truthfulness toward the
issue of fault.
230. I use the term "mutual-help," because a reputable publication has as much interest as a
defamed plaintiff in correcting a falsehood. The opportunity for such a negotiated remedy, possi-
bly assisted by a fact-finder, is explored more fully in Ackerman, supra note 11, at 24-25.
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cisions made at the city desk.3 The continued availability of punitive
damages in the absence of correction or clarification exacerbates the temp-
tation to take the inexpensive, if unprincipled, way out.
For plaintiffs, the ability of the publisher to limit damages unilaterally
poses at least a theoretical problem.232 As a practical matter, however, full
damages are available under current law only after protracted and painful
litigation, and are often ephemeral. 3 Yet these damages represent a real
threat to defendants, who must always bear in mind the worst case scenario
in the form of the huge damage award. The win/win possibilities under the
Correction Act hold the promise of a better situation for all.
The beauty of the Correction Act lies in its potential for the avoidance
of protracted litigation through preventive lawyering. It will require signifi-
cant behavioral changes on the part of litigants and their counsel in order to
take full advantage of this elegant mechanism. Publishers who stubbornly
insist on "standing by their story" regardless of its dubious veracity will
continue to face the high costs and enormous exposure characteristic of
current defamation litigation. Attorneys who fail to read and comprehend
the new rules and respond appropriately may find their clients wanting for
remedies." 4 Different types of fee agreements may become necessary, as
defamed plaintiffs obtain much of their satisfaction not through damage
awards, but through correction and clarification. Lawyers and clients who
fail to seize the opportunities presented by the Correction Act may pay
dearly.
235
The Correction Act dramatically alters the way plaintiffs and defend-
ants are likely to go about litigating defamation cases without dramatically
changing the underlying law of libel and slander. The effect of the Act, at
the very least, should be benign. While providing defendants an opportu-
nity to limit damages without an explicit admission of wrongdoing, it pro-
vides a measure of vindication to plaintiffs, at least when defendants are
231. Preservation of the "historical wall ... between business and news" can be cause for
concern even at the nation's most venerable newspaper. See Ken Auletta, Opening Up the Times,
THm Naw YoRKER, June 28, 1993, at 55, 64-66.
232. I have already discussed how, to some state courts, this poses a constitutional problem.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-85.
233. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
234. The very elegance of the Correction Act may serve as a stumbling block for the uniniti-
ated. Novice counsel might fall to understand the Act's subtleties and, like the Emperor Joseph in
Amadeus, find that it contains "too many notes." See AmADEus (Thorn EMI 1984). The Mozarts
of the profession, willing to read the text and stir their creative juices, are more likely to find that
it contains "just as many notes, majesty, as required, neither more, nor less." Id.
235. As an older lawyer once said to me, "The bulls make a little money, the bears make a
little money, and the pigs starve." Statement by Lawrence Levin to author (circa 1977).
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willing to admit error 36 What the Correction Act does not do, however, is
provide better options to plaintiffs defamed by irresponsible defendants
willing to heedlessly scatter defamatory innuendo and let the chips fall
where they may.3 7 Nor does the Correction Act offer any additional pro-
tection to defendants who wish to stand, on principle, behind a story they
believe to be accurate, notwithstanding the efforts of plaintiffs who hope to
"win by suing" or risk all in pursuit of the home run.2 38 The Correction Act
should therefore accomplish its purpose most effectively when there are
reasonable people, acting in good faith, on both sides of the conflict. To the
extent the perverse results of present-day defamation litigation are attributa-
ble to systemic problems, and not to personal idiosyncracies of the litigants,
we can look forward to an improved state of affairs under the Correction
Act.
There is, of course, no guarantee that parties to defamation actions will
avail themselves of the Correction Act as often as is hoped. Retraction
statutes already on the books in a number of states have had limited effect
on the volume or contsequences of defamation litigation.239 A few years
experience with the Correction Act may demonstrate that more comprehen-
sive defamation law reform remains necessary.
236. Note that complete vindication is not provided where the defendant attributes the state-
ment to another person under § 6(b)(2)(iil); rather, it shifts the focus to another, perhaps less
credible, defendant. UNIF. CORR. OR CLAw. ACT, supra note 7, § 6(b)(2)(iii).
237. Plaintiffs who have been falsely defamed by unrepentant publishers will still have to run
the gamut of rules pertaining to defamation actions, including, in most instances, the burden of
proving fault.
238. Ironically it is these plaintiffs, who neither merit nor should receive damage-limiting
corrections or clarifications, who stand the greatest chance of obtaining the highest damage
awards. The growing willingness to risk all for the long shot is metaphorically demonstrated by
Mickey Mantle's response to a reporter's query about Reggie Jackson's having surpassed him in
career home runs. Replied the former Yankee switch-hitter: "He passed me on the alltime strike-
out list a couple of years ago and nobody asked me about that." Scorecard, SPORTs ILLusTRArED,
June 2, 1986, at 18, 18.
239. A recent survey reported 33 states with retraction statutes. Current Retraction Practice,
supra note 130, at 2. Respondents to the survey generally believed that the statutes tended to
encourage publication of corrections or retractions and diminish the likelihood of litigation. Il at
8-9. Still, the statutes have failed to arrest the problems affecting defamation litigation. See supra
text accompanying notes 11-56. This failure may be attributable to a number of factors: (1) Some
retraction statutes have been found unconstitutional, in whole or in part. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 168-85. (2) Most retraction statutes eliminate only punitive damages and thereby
provide less incentive for retraction than a statute eliminating general damages. See Current Re-
traction Practice, supra note 130, at 7. (3) Some retraction statutes provide a very small time
period within which publishers are permitted to retract. Id. at 5-6. (4) Existing retraction statutes
apply to only certain types of publishers, usually media groups; only one applies to all defendants.
Id. at 8. (5) Inconsistencies in the retraction provisions of the various states render it most diffi-
cult for a nationwide publication to retract effectively. See infra text accompanying note 265.
Widespread adoption of a Uniform Correction Act would alter all but the first factor. It
would not, however, eliminate the possibility that retractions are hard to come by due to human
nature; that is, people simply might be too stubborn to use or accept them.
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C. A Proposal.
The challenge to those seeking comprehensive defamation law reform
is to fashion a remedy that accommodates the need to protect two seem-
ingly irreconcilable values: speech and reputation. This challenge is met,
albeit imperfectly, by a remedy that allows for recovery of objectively mea-
sured damages only upon a showing of actual malice, while employing the
tripartite verdict to allow for vindication of plaintiffs who can prove that
they have been falsely defamed. This remedy would protect defamation
defendants against crippling damage awards, while providing deserving
plaintiffs a measure of reputational relief. At the same time, it works as a
disincentive for litigants-in particular, plaintiffs who have been truthfully
defamed-who might otherwise abuse the process and harass their
opponents.
1. Issues for Determination
Specifically, I propose that a court hearing a defamation case should
present three issues to the jury: (1) whether the defendant published a de-
famatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) whether the statement was
false; and (3) whether the statement was made with actual malice. 40 The
plaintiff would have the burden of proving each of these elements by clear
and convincing evidence. The same standards would apply for public offi-
cials, public figures or private plaintiffs. Similarly, there would be no legal
distinction between media and non-media defendants.
If the plaintiff cannot even establish the falsity of the allegedly defam-
atory statement, then judgment should be entered for the defendant and the
court should award reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant.2 41 I have
argued that fee shifting should generally be avoided in the absence of bad
faith on the part of one of the litigants, as established by objective crite-
ria.2 42 I submit that the bringing of an action for defamation regarding
statements that are not demonstrably false-and who knows better whether
they are false than the plaintiff?.-is an objective criterion for bad faith suf-
240. These questions resemble those presented to the jury by Judge Sofaer in the Sharon trial.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
241. A good argument could be made for shifting the defendant's fees only after an additional
factual finding, employing the proposed Act's standard (applicable only under the Act's vindica-
tion remedy), that "the plaintiff had no reasonable basis upon which to allege falsity." PROPoSED
UNm. DEFAMATION Acr, supra note 4, § 3-104(a)(2). I am disinclined to encumber the process
with an additional factual finding that would also entail a shifted burden of proof. An adequate
safeguard against a chilling effect on meritorious litigation can be provided by employing another
Defamation Act provision to the effect that "an award of expenses and attorney's fees to a prevail-
ing party ... may not be disproportionate to the reasonable value of similar expenses and legal
services of the other party." Id. § 3-104(b). This sensible provision protects a party from having
to pay excess fees of another party who persists in overlitigating the case.
242. See supra note 100.
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ficient to trigger an award of reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of
litigation.
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving only the first two elements (a de-
famatory statement and falsity), the jury should so indicate, and the plaintiff
should be free to publish this finding at her own expense through whatever
means are available.t 3 In that situation, the plaintiff achieves a form of
vindication, and the defendant is spared payment of money damages. No
attorney's fees or other costs would be shifted. The proposal, like the pro-
posed Defamation Act's vindication remedy, departs from the current pro-
cedure by allowing cases to go forward even where the defendant would be
entitled to summary judgment on the fault issue..
2. Damages
Should the plaintiff succeed in proving all three elements, including
actual malice, she should be provided a make-whole remedy in the form of
money damages. The components of this damage award would be com-
puted as follows:
a. Economic Damages
A successful plaintiff should recover all provable out-of-pocket losses
occasioned by reason of the defamatory statement. These would include
loss of business, diminished employment prospects, and the like. Allowed
under present law upon competent proof, this recovery is also available
under the Correction Act, even in the event the defendant has made a suffi-
cient correction or clarification.
b. Attorney's Fees and Other Costs
Having proved actual malice on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff
should receive reimbursement of all reasonable costs of litigation, including
attorney's fees. Just as the bringing of an action regarding a statement that
is not demonstrably false amounts to bad faith on the part of the plaintiff,
the making of a defamatory statement knowing that it is false, or with reck-
less disregard for truth or falsity, amounts to bad faith on the part of a
defendant.2' Here, actual malice acts as the objective criterion of bad faith
sufficient to trigger a fee shift.
243. Alternatively, a private figure plaintiff could be awarded sufficient damages to purchase
a published retraction, in light of the difficulty such plaintiffs might otherwise have in clearing
their names. I am disinclined, however, to continue to complicate matters by retaining two classi-
fications of plaintiffs. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
244. Arguably, persisting in litigation once a statement has been demonstrated to be false,
through proof submitted in connection with a demand for retraction, is one form of bad faith that
should encumber the defendant with the plaintiff's attorney's fees from the time at which the
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c. Vindication Damages
The optimal remedy for defamation would involve not general dam-
ages for injury to reputation but concrete measures to restore the plaintiff's
reputation .1 5 To some extent, the plaintiff may achieve a measure of vindi-
cation through a favorable judgment.246 The potential publicity of a plain-
tiff's judgment may fall far short of complete relief, however, especially in
less prominent cases or when the plaintiff has limited financial means.
247
Therefore, plaintiffs who have proved actual malice should enjoy a means
of publicizing their victory in a manner sufficient to erase the defamatory
blemish cast upon them by defendants. In most cases, achieving this goal
will require something more than a retraction in the defendant's publication.
Not only is the ordering of such a retraction constitutionally suspect,248 but
there is no guarantee that a single retraction, published in the same manner
as the original defamatory statement, will reach the audience originally or
subsequently affected by that statement. 24 9 Far broader communication is
likely to be necessary, whether the original statement was an article in a
newspaper or magazine, a statement broadcast on radio or television, or a
slanderous statement uttered on a street comer or at a cocktail party.
The vindication remedy would best be shaped by the trial judge, who
would consider the type and amount of publicity necessary to make the
falsity of the statement became obvious to the defendant. A determination of subjective bad
faith--e.g., at what point did the defendant realize that the statement was untrue?-might be
difficult in such instances. A determination of objective irresponsibility (i.e., at what point should
the defendant have realized that the statement was untrue) reverts to a negligence standard, which
may be an insufficient basis for fee shifting.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 222-27.
246. Vindication through publicity of a favorable judgment underlies both the vindication
remedy set forth in the Defamation Act and the declaratory relief afforded by the tripartite special
verdict suggested above.
247. In the most publicized cases a favorable verdict is most likely to vindicate the reputation
of the plaintiff, with or without money damages. Carol Burnett emerged from her highly publi-
cized battle with the National Enquirer with reputation intact, despite the reduction of her damage
award. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rptr. 1321, 1324 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981),
aft'd, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). Wally
Butts will forever be enshrined in the annals of Georgia football. See Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1967).
248. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. A voluntary retraction under the Correction
Act would involve no objections under the U.S. Constitution. See supra note 165 and accompany-
ing text.
249. The same objection could be made with respect to the requirements for a "timely and
sufficient correction or clarification" under § 6 of the Correction Act. The Act requires that a
correction or clarification be "published with a prominence and in a manner and medium reason-
ably likely to reach substantially the same audience as the publication complained of." UNip.
CORR. OR CLARw. Acr, supra note 7, § 6(b)(1). Under the Act, "a later issue, edition, or broad-
cast of the original publication" suffices. Id. § 6(c). What if Monday's newspaper or television
audience misses Tuesday's edition or broadcast? Perhaps republication by competing media or
word of mouth will pick up the slack, but it is hardly a guarantee.
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plaintiff's reputation "whole."" 0  Evidence could be presented as to the
cost of various make-whole alternatives, probably in the second part of a
bifurcated proceeding (the jury having found actual malice in the first
part). 1 A constitutional guarantee of a jury role in awarding damages" 2
might require a jury determination as to the amount of vindication damages,
perhaps after the judge has determined the type and extent of publicity re-
quired. Judicial creativity would be encouraged, within constitutional con-
straints." The court would not be empowered to order the defendant to
publish a corrective statement, but an offending publication's advertising
rates could be relevant in determining the amount of money damages neces-
sary to vindicate the plaintiff's reputation.
The judgment for vindication damages could be used by the plaintiff to
publicize her vindication by the jury, 4 but the plaintiff would not be re-
quired to apply the judgment to such a purpose. Should the plaintiff prefer
to drown her sorrows with a new convertible or a trip to Puerto Vallarta,
that should be her prerogative. What is important is the establishment of
objectively determinable limits on damages to reputation and the shaping of
a remedy that bears some relation to the injury incurred. This remedy could
be applied to non-media defendants found liable for relatively private slan-
derous statements as well as to media defendants found liable for widely
circulated libelous statements. The medium and extent of the corrective
publication would vary with the need;" 5 the general principle of vindica-
tion would remain the same.
250. While I offer no assurances, perhaps the financial support for vindication provided under
this remedy would satisfy courts looking for full relief to plaintiffs under "open courts" provisions
of state constitutions. See supra text accompanying note 169-72. I would argue that this substi-
tute remedy eliminates any constitutional objection, particularly in light of the greater threat to
free speech posed by open-ended general damages under the current system.
251. Bifurcation would allow the parties to take advantage of a brief interval between the
liability and damages phases to work out their own settlement regarding a corrective publication.
252. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986) (citing VA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 11); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987) (citing FLA. CoNsT. art.
I, §§ 21-22); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691-92 (Tex. 1988) (citing Tax. CoNsT. art.
n, § 1).
253. Care must be taken to conform to the holdings of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962) (requiring the
submission of legal issues to the jury where a jury trial has been timely and properly demanded).
254. For example, the plaintiff might use the award to purchase advertising space.
255. Cases involving widely known public figures are likely to require the smallest amounts
of vindication damages, as they are natural recipients of free publicity. A brief (one week) inter-
val between the liability and damages phases of a bifurcated proceeding may provide opportunity
for an assessment of the need for damages to publicize the plaintiffs vindication. By that time,
some plaintiffs will have completed the full talk show circuit.
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d. What Has Been Left Out?
Conspicuous by their absence from this damage formulation are gen-
eral damages for injury to reputation and punitive damages. 5 6 These forms
of damages have spun out of control and often bear little or no relationship
to the injury sustained; punitives by definition, general damages as a matter
of practice. To the extent a plaintiff's reputation has been injured, an ade-
quate remedy can be provided in the form of objectively measured vindica-
tion damages. Attorney's fees, which previously have been covered sub
rosa by generous awards of general or punitive damages, would now be
awarded explicitly, based on competent evidence." 7
In sum, the proposal contemplates the following combination of ele-
ments and remedies:
FIGuRE, 2: Ti PROPOSED SOLUTION: ELEMENTS AND REMEDIES
Elements (i.e., what Remedies (i.e., what plaintiff gets)
plaintiff must prove)
Defamatory statement l Vindication (i.e., declaratory
FalsityJ judgment but no damages)
Pecuniary damages
Actual malice Attorney's fees and other costs
Vindication damages
Under this proposal, damages play a secondary role, providing the
gap-fillers necessary to make the plaintiff whole through provision for eco-
nomic loss and attorney's fees. Repair to the plaintiff's reputation, insofar
as reputational harm is not represented by economic loss, would be accom-
plished primarily through the mechanism of the jury verdict itself: a state-
ment by representatives of the community who have sifted through the
evidence and determined that the record deserves correction. Damages
would then play a role in assuring that this corrective information-the aim
of the plaintiff's action-is communicated to the public.
256. In this sense, the proposal is consistent with the consequences of a correction or clarifica-
tion under the Correction Act. I believe that punitive damages should be unavailable under any
circumstance, however, and that their unavailability should not be predicated upon a retraction the
defendant is in no position to provide.
257. With respect to attorney's fees, evidence of the plaintiff's attorney's billing rates, and
their relationship to the usual and reasonable amounts billed for such services, would replace jury
speculation. Instead of pulling a figure for general damages out of thin air, the jury would now be
required to assess the real costs of vindication through advertising and other means.
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3. Some Self-Criticism
Admittedly, this proposal offers imperfect and incomplete remedies.
Particularly in the case of non-public figures, publication of a corrective
statement may escape widespread public notice. Thus, the scars of libelous
statements may never be fully eradicated. Still, payment of attorney's fees,
restoration of economic loss, and assurance of a published retraction, or the
funds necessary to purchase one, may provide some plaintiffs with a more
complete and practical remedy than is available under current law or the
Correction Act. Just as significantly, the proposed remedy should dampen
the enthusiasm of plaintiffs who hope to obtain unwarranted, inflated
awards consisting largely of general and punitive damages-awards unleav-
ened by any objective standard of measurement.
The remedy suggested here meets our three criteria, albeit imperfectly.
By means of the tripartite verdict, it provides a modicum of relief to even
those plaintiffs who cannot demonstrate that a defamatory statement was
made with actual malice. This relief is relatively costless for defendants,
who are in turn protected against damages of numbing proportions, even
when actual malice is shown. It thereby provides far greater protection for
speech than does current defamation law. The remedy meets our efficiency
criterion in that it clearly delineates the issues, thereby promoting settle-
ment in summary judgment in whole or in part, and sets forth clear stan-
dards for the jury-particularly in the area of damages. 1it should therefore
encourage swifter litigation and more settlements, particularly if it takes
codified form.
Nevertheless, the proposal fails to fulfill each criterion perfectly. First
Amendment absolutists' s8 are likely to decry almost any remedy for defam-
atory speech involving public officials; short of that, they may scoff at the
"truth trial"" 9 allowed under the tripartite verdict.2 60 Further, those who
258. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Justices Goldberg and Black
authored separate concurrences, both joined by Justice Douglas, advocating this view. Id. at 293
(Black, J., concurring) and 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring). These justices felt that the First
Amendment gave the citizen and the press "an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize offi-
cial conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses." Id. at 298 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
259. Critics of the proposed Act's vindication remedy labeled it a "truth trial." Libel Defense
Resource Center Bulletin, The Uniform Defamation Act: An LRDC Special Report, Special Issue
A, June 30, 1992, at 10. Because the tripartite verdict also allows vindication without fault, the
same label may apply here. Of course, falsity of the defamatory statement is an element of almost
every defamation case. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
260. By all rights, the media should be the last to complain about a no-fault vindication rem-
edy. With no provision for plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs of a published retraction in the
absence of fault, contra PROPosED Umn'. DEF. Acr. §§ 3-103, 104, the only cost of an adverse
judgment to a publisher is having its reputation for veracity besmirched-hardly cause for com-
plaint by those who seek protection from liability for reputational harm. Under this proposal, the
defendant at least receives full due process protection, including notice and opportunity to be
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have suffered reputational injury may protest the incompieteness of the
remedy-particularly those who cannot overcome the actual malice hurdle.
Potential objections remain under the "open courts" provisions of state con-
stitutions. Nevertheless, the remedy suggested here represents a reasonable
accommodation of competing constitutional, remedial, and pragmatic inter-
ests, a solution that permits both plaintiffs and defendants to be "winners"
to some extent, and a viable alternative to current law and practice.
4. The Proposal and the Correction Act Compared
The proposal offered here is more ambitious and far-reaching than the
Correction Act. While the Correction Act eliminates general and punitive
damages in the event of a sufficient correction or clarification, my proposal
eliminates general and punitive damages under any circumstance, replacing
them with litigation expenses and vindication damages in addition to eco-
nomic loss. My proposal contemplates adoption of such streamlining provi-
sions of the proposed Defamation Act as the merger of libel and slander
into one cause of action, the elimination of any distinction between media
and non-media defendants, and the codification of privileges;2 61 it also
eliminates the distinction between public and private plaintiffs.
Addressing none of these matters, the Correction Act represents a re-
treat from the Drafting Committee's original intent to effect comprehensive
defamation law reform. In light of recent history, however, it is difficult to
fault the Drafting Committee for its choice. Reform legislation should be
advanced to obtain concrete, practical results, not to satisfy academic con-
cepts of beauty. Given the common objectives of the Correction Act and
the reform proposal suggested here, it would be prudent to first give the
Correction Act a fighting chance. Should it survive legislative and judicial
scrutiny and accomplish its ends, defamation litigation should be changed
for the better. Should the Correction Act fall short of its goals, we might
look to more comprehensive reform proposals.262
heard, before "publication" of the injurious information. That is more than many publishers pro-
vide for the targets of their defamatory stories.
261. See supra notes 59-64, 70-72 and accompanying text.
262. There is precedent for overlapping uniform legislation in the tort field. The Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was approved by the Commissioners in 1955. It has since
been enacted in over a dozen jurisdictions. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, a more compre-
hensive statute that includes provisions for contribution among tortfeasors, was approved by the
Commissioners in 1977. Since then, it has been enacted by two legislatures and one state supreme
court. IOWA CODE §§ 668.1-668.15 (1984); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.22.005-4.22.925 (1981);
Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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VI. Tim VEHICLE FOR REFORM
Once we have settled upon the substance of defamation law reform, we
must determine the proper vehicle for its implementation. In making this
determination, we should focus on three inquiries: Is there a need for uni-
formity? Is there a need for legislation? What is politically feasible?
A. Is There a Need for Uniformity?
In a recent article on defamation law reform,263 Professor David A.
Anderson presented an articulate argument for the need for reform on a
nationwide basis:
Any reform that must be accomplished one state at a time
offers little comfort to the national media or even to local media
whose broadcasts or publications cross state lines. Their risk as-
sessments must take into account the least protective state law to
which they may be subject. The flexibility of modem jurisdic-
tional, venue, and choice-of-law rules often allows a plaintiff to
choose a state whose law is congenial." 4 The benefits of statu-
tory reform would be fully available to the media only if adopted
federally or by all the states uniformly.265
The interstate implications of defamation, at least of the libelous vari-
ety, should be clear. Material differences in the law of defamation invite
plaintiffs to file suit in the friendliest forum. In addition, the wide range of
retraction statutes, varying in many details, is likely to render futile almost
any retraction effort, at least in cases where a publication is distributed na-
tionally. So long as publishers face different procedures and different con-
sequences in different jurisdictions, efforts to correct or clarify may be to
little avail. Uniform legislation would largely eliminate these problems.
Uniformity would also be of concern if only select states were to enact
the dramatic changes contemplated under the proposed Defamation Act or
advocated in this article. While many would view such reforms as enlight-
ened experiments in the Brandeisian mold,266 the resulting forum shop
would frustrate a true test of these experiments. Public figures unable to
obtain damages in any event, due to the difficulty of proving actual malice,
263. Anderson, supra note 11.
264. Here, Professor Anderson cites Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779
(1984), which allowed a plaintiff with no connection to the forum state to take advantage of that
state's unique statute of limitations so long as the defendant had the requisite minimum contacts.
265. Anderson, supra note 11, at 546.
266. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens chose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting); see also Franklin, supra note 3, at 819 (espousing this view in the context of
defamation law reform).
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would seek vindication in states that had adopted these reforms; private
figures who desire the present panoply of damage remedies and other plain-
tiffs who hope to "win by suing" would file in states that had not adopted
these reforms.
B. Is There a Need for Legislation?
Professor Anderson's solution to this dilemma is to cast the United
States Supreme Court as the principal reformer of libel law.267 As dis-
cussed earlier, this is problematic because the Court is not in the business of
shaping new remedies for state causes of action; it can only pare down
existing ones as required by the Constitution.268 Acknowledging this prob-
lem, Anderson nonetheless argues, "Having created the system that is the
source of so much dissatisfaction, the Court cannot now demur on the
ground that law reform is not its business.
2 69
Certainly, some reforms suggested on these pages may be imposed by
the Court. Elimination of punitive damages and the imposition of a require-
ment that actual damages for reputational harm bear some relationship to
the effort necessary to cleanse one's name are within the Court's power to
place constitutional limitations on state law remedies that infringe upon
speech.270 The Court also can give its blessing to procedural innovations in
the federal courts, such as Judge Sofaer's tripartite verdict.271 Other
changes, including the erection of an elegant system of correction or clarifi-
cation (as in the Correction Act), the creation of an ornate vindication rem-
edy (as in the proposed Defamation Act), or the awarding of attorney's fees
to successful litigants under limited circumstances (as advocated here), face
more serious conceptual hurdles.
For the Supreme Court to create new remedies for what has so long
been considered a state cause of action would be widely regarded as a judi-
cial intrusion into the legislative realm and a federal intrusion across consti-
tutionally demarcated boundaries. 2  Judicially mandated correction and
clarification provisions such as those provided for under the Correction Act
267. Anderson, supra note 11, at 554.
268. See supra text accompanying note 2.
269. Anderson, supra note 11, at 554.
270. Decisions to this effect might trump state court efforts to strike down reform legislation
on the basis of "open courts" provisions in state constitutions. However, the Court's allowance of
presumed and punitive damages in the absence of actual malice, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-63 (1985), would indicate that it may not be ready to
take these steps.
271. Justice White tentatively endorsed this device in his concurring opinion in Dun & Brad-
street. Id. at 768 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
272. The defense of federalism may be more dependent on one's position on the subject mat-
ter of legislation or judicial activity than on the principle of division of powers. The call by the
recently departed Republican administration for a significant federal role in wide-scale tort reform
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would raise similar objections. In Sullivan, the Warren Court made a dar-
ing move in recognizing that the state's provision of a remedy for defama-
tory speech had First Amendment ramifications. It would take an equally
daring move for today's Court to appropriate the law of defamation so as to
craft its own remedies or impose time frames for corrections and clarifica-
tions. The present Court has not indicated a taste for such adventure.
2 73
That leaves us with the prospect of a legislative remedy. Legislation
carries the advantage of providing for comprehensive reform rather than the
piecemeal responses characteristic of litigation. With codification comes
greater predictability of outcome, better risk avoidance, and more settle-
ments. Codification of defamation law and, in particular, rules regarding
correction and clarification, should remove much of the guesswork and
gamesmanship, and, therefore, much of the expense, that accompanies pres-
ent-day defamation actions.274
Granted, much mischief can occur when uniform or model legislation
enters the legislative process.275 The future of the most political of all torts,
however, cannot and will not be decided exclusively in the halls of
demonstrates that concerns regarding federalism may be largely a matter of whose ox is being
gored.
273. The present Court appears to have abjured both the liberal activism of the Warren years
and the reactionary designs of recent Republican administrations in favor of a cautious centrism
typified by the jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (upholding portions of Pennsylvania's restrictive abor-
tion law while refusing to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
274. Perhaps the most articulate argument against legislative reform was offered by a pub-
lisher who appeared at the Drafting Committee's October 9, 1992 hearing:
Language is not a product, a steel bolt with specifications of strength, or a car, a
lawn mower. It cannot be confined to a grammar book or a dictionary. It changes with
time, with the social environment, the context of life itself. It changes and may be
different on different levels and types of society and culture. Times change meanings.
The impact of time changes the impact of language. And, no language changes so
quickly as the American language. An American-speaking Russian I met... pointed
out that American English was the most exciting language in the world because it con-
stantly changes to adapt to the real life situations and discourse amongst our citizens. It
is the now language....
In that context, we find that the proposed Uniform Defamation Act would virtually
freeze a body in law that evolved and continues to evolve through handling individual
cases within the flexible structure of common law.
Testimony of William B. Northrop on behalf of the Newspaper Ass'n of America and American
Society of Newspaper Editors at 3-4 (Drafting Committee hearing, Washington, D.C., Oct. 9,
1992).
275. As one press spokesman has remarked about the proposed Defamation Act, "If you toss
this proposal into the laps of the elected representatives who are regularly covered by our newspa-
pers in pursuit of their responsibilities and their regular re-election, you know not what you do."
Testimony of Sam D. Kennedy, supra note 103, at 10. In a similar vein, the National Newspaper
Association has expressed reservations regarding the Correction Act not because of the substance
of the Act, but because of the potential for mischief in the form of amendments by state legisla-
tures faced with the prospect of libel law reform. PuBLIsHR's Auxru tY, Aug. 16, 1993, at 1.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
academia or even the relative detachment of the courthouse. Just as Con-
gress was forced to respond constructively to judicial activism in the field
of civil rights,276 legislatures should ultimately have to face the hard
choices necessary for tort reform.
C. What Is Politically Feasible?
The problem with legislation is an obvious one: To ensure enactment,
it is necessary to forge a political consensus. In the case of uniform legisla-
tion, the consensus must be broad enough to secure fairly simultaneous en-
actment in most, if not all, states. Enactment of legislation in a few
"media-intensive" states, such as New York and California,2 77 might influ-
ence adoption in other states, much as New York's 1962 enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code encouraged acceptance of that statute in almost
every state.27 8 Prudence dictates that early efforts to enact the Correction
Act be concentrated in those jurisdictions whose courts have displayed
friendly attitudes toward tort reform measures. 279
While one may argue for the enactment of comprehensive legislation
of the type advanced in this Article, political reality suggests a more con-
servative approach.280 The most prudent course of action is to encourage
widespread adoption of the Correction Act, and hope that its supporters'
loftiest expectations are fulfilled. Should the Correction Act fail to meet
these goals, further reform proposals might best be presented in the context
of general tort reform. Conservatives who favor damage limitations in per-
sonal injury actions would be hard-pressed to oppose them in actions based
on speech. Liberals might warm to a general tort reform proposal providing
greater protection for the press than the Supreme Court seems prepared to
276. The landmark Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968 may be seen as congressional
responses to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny. Of course, it
would be naive to suggest that it was Warren Court activism alone that produced this legislation.
277. California may not be the most politically hospitable jurisdiction for early enactment of
the Correction Act. California's current retraction statute, CAL. CiviL CODE § 48a (Deering
1990), is, not surprisingly, quite protective of the media. Like the Correction Act, the California
statute limits the plaintiffs recovery to special damages after a correction has been made. Id.
Furthermore, California requires the plaintiff to demand a correction within 20 days after knowl-
edge of the publication, a shorter time period than that allowed under the Correction Act. Id.; see
also UN a. CORR. OR C.Artw. Acr, supra note 7, § 3(b) (providing for 90 day period). This
media-friendly state is therefore unlikely to enact a less protective statute until it becomes recog-
nized as the national standard.
278. Prior to 1962, only 14 states had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. Within five
years of the Code's enactment by the nation's leading commercial state, every state except Louisi-
ana had enacted a version of the U.C.C. See 1 U.L.A. 1 (1989).
279. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
280. In light of the unenthusiastic response to the proposed Defamation Act, it is probably best
to wait before rolling out another comprehensive reform proposal. Furthermore, the Correction
Act may prove so effective that further reform is unnecessary.
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grant.281 Advocates of alternative dispute resolution might also support
legislation calling for an array of remedies tailored to address the parties'
underlying interests, just as they should cheer the Correction Act's efforts
to promote efficient, win/win settlements.
A natural constituency for defamation law reform might exist within
the state legislatures themselves. Legislators, about whom the media report
every day, may view themselves as potential defamation plaintiffs.2 82 If a
reform proposal is perceived as anti-plaintiff, it is likely to encounter oppo-
sition within the legislature. Both the Correction Act and the proposal set
forth in this Article, however, have features that some plaintiffs-particu-
larly public officials-might appreciate. For example, imposition of an ac-
tual malice standard on all defendants (which I propose as a requirement for
damages), would impose no greater burden on public officials who are sub-
ject to the actual malice standard under present law. Moreover, the availa-
bility of vindication through correction, clarification, or tripartite verdict
might be attractive to a legislator willing to forego the burden of proving
actual malice, obtain quick vindication, and move on with her career.
If the prospect of enacting a reform proposal in fifty state legislatures
seems daunting, congressional action may appear more inviting. A federal
statute would be one means of assuring uniformity, and a credible case for
federal intervention may be based on Congress's Morganic powers under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause.283 We
would be deluding ourselves, however, to think that defamation law reform
appears high on Congress's list of national priorities.
281. There is an obvious irony here: Conservatives tend to be pro-defendant and liberals
pro-plaintiff on general issues of tort reform. With respect to defamation law, however, their
positions appear to have been reversed.
282. Those who assume that the courts would naturally take a more detached view of defama-
tion litigation might take a look at Pennsylvania, where several members of the state supreme
court have commenced defamation actions in the past decade. See, e.g., Larsen v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 602 A.2d 324, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (reporting Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Justice Rolf Larsen's defamation action against newspapers that published stories about an
investigation of the justice).
283. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966), the Court established that § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise
its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." In Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980), the Court
legitimized congressional enactment of a prophylactic rule in the context of voting rights legisla-
tion supportive of Fifteenth Amendment principles. These cases would appear to support the view
that Congress could, consistent with its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (through
which the First Amendment is applied to the states), enact comprehensive legislation concerning
defamation. The First Amendment's traditional use as a shield, rather than a sword, with respect
to a cause of action recognized under state law may defeat the analogy. This issue is deserving of
a law review article unto itself.
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While the immediate prospects for comprehensive defamation law re-
form are not particularly bright,284 the political landscape could change. A
decision by the Supreme Court might send a signal to Congress or ignite a
spark that spreads throughout the state legislatures. Should that happen, it
would be helpful to have a carefully considered proposal to which a legisla-
ture could turn. 285 At that point, the drafting of uniform or model legisla-
tion would become more than a mere academic exercise.
VII. CONCLUSION
The disarray in current defamation law strongly suggests the need for
reform. The grafting of constitutional limitations on an archaic body of
common law has created a system that neither vindicates the reputations of
worthy plaintiffs nor preserves the First Amendment interests of potential
defendants.
Responding to this problem, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws convened a committee to draft a proposed Uniform Defamation Act.
This comprehensive reform proposal was ultimately withdrawn in the face
of intense media opposition to the proposed Act's "no-fault, no damages"
vindication remedy. In its place, the Commissioners approved a Uniform
Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act, drawn largely from one arti-
cle of the withdrawn Act. Without modifying the underlying law, the Cor-
rection Act seeks to change the way parties go about trying and settling
defamation cases. The Correction Act eliminates general and punitive dam-
ages where the publisher of a defamatory statement makes a timely and
sufficient correction or clarification. In so doing, it encourages early termi-
nation of disputes to the parties' mutual satisfaction.
Implementation of the Correction Act may be hindered by constitu-
tional challenges in state courts, several of which have declared similar re-
traction statutes unconstitutional. Widespread enactment of the Correction
Act, however, should produce better results than existing retraction statutes,
as publishers will be able to employ a uniform correction procedure offer-
ing protection nationwide. In the final analysis, the success of the Correc-
tion Act will depend largely on whether parties to defamation disputes are
willing to alter their conduct so as to avail themselves of the opportunities
the Act presents.
284. The prospects for enactment of the Correction Act, however, might be substantially
better.
285. A uniform act also could serve as inspiration to a court. The Missouri Supreme Court
went as far as to adopt, in its entirety, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act when it decided to
eliminate contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. See Gustafson v. Benda, 661
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). The Kentucky Supreme Court also has seen fit to adopt
portions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174,
177-78 (Ky. 1987); Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984).
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As the ultimate success of the Correction Act cannot be certain, it re-
mains prudent to consider other reform proposals. The proposal set forth
here would codify the tripartite verdict procedure, which provides for ex-
plicit jury findings as to defamation, falsity and actual malice. This proce-
dure allows plaintiffs to obtain vindication through a finding of a false and
defamatory statement, provides for damages where the defendant has acted
in bad faith, and works as a disincentive to truthfully defamed persons who
might otherwise abuse the system. By limiting damages to economic
losses, reasonable attorney's fees, and amounts necessary to secure vindica-
tion, we can advance plaintiffs' interests in clearing their names while pro-
tecting the First Amendment rights of publishers.
Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court, with the best of
intentions, set defamation law on a new course. Unfortunately, the path
taken by the Court has protected neither speech nor reputation in the desired
manner. With the Correction Act, the Commissioners have offered a slight
course correction, anticipating that it will produce more favorable out-
comes. It may not be time for dancing in the streets, but perhaps the band is
warming up.
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